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Abstract
Global communication networks like the Internet often lack a central authority
that monitors and regulates network traffic. Mostly even cooperation among
network users is not possible. Network users may behave selfishly according
to their private interest without regard to the overall system performance.
Such highly complex environments prompted a paradigm shift in computer
science. Whereas traditional concepts are designed for stand-alone machines
and manageable networks, a profound understanding of large-scale commu-
nication systems with strategic users requires to combine methods from the-
oretical computer science with game-theoretic techniques. This motivates the
analysis of network traffic in the framework of non-cooperative game theory.
The principal aspect of this theory is the notion of equilibrium that describes
stable outcomes of a non-cooperative game.
In his seminal paper, Wardrop introduced a game-theoretic model in the
1950s for describing resource sharing problems in the context of road traffic
systems. Wardrop’s traffic model has attracted a lot of interest and inspired a
great deal of research, especially after the emergence of huge non-cooperative
systems like the Internet. In this thesis, we follow this line of research and
study equilibrium situations in Wardrop’s traffic model. In Wardrop’s model
a rate of traffic between each pair of vertices of a network is modeled as net-
work flow, i. e., traffic is allowed to split into arbitrary pieces. The resources
are the network edges with latency functions quantifying the time needed to
traverse an edge. The latency of an edge depends on the congestion. It in-
creases the more flow traverses that edge. A common interpretation of the
Wardrop model is that flow is controlled by an infinite number of agents each
of which is responsible to route an infinitesimal amount of traffic between its
origin and destination vertex. Each agent plays a pure strategy in choosing one
path from its origin to its destination, where the agent’s disutility is the sum
of edge latencies on this path. Note that this game-theoretic model permits
extremely complex mutual dependencies among the agents’ disutilities pre-
cluding application of standard optimization methods. A solution concept for
this network game is provided by the theory of Wardrop equilibria. A Wardrop
equilibrium denotes a strategy profile in which all used paths between a given
2origin-destination pair have equal and minimal latency. Wardrop equilibria
are also Nash equilibria as no agent can decrease its experienced latency by
unilaterally deviating to another path.
Wardrop equilibria are known to possess a number of desirable proper-
ties. Foremost, they are optimal solutions to a related convex optimization
problem which guarantees their existence and essential uniqueness. More-
over, Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently using general purpose
algorithms for convex programming. All of these positive results do not hold
for Nash equilibria in general games. In fact, in general games Nash equilib-
ria are guaranteed to exist only in mixed strategies, there may exist multiple
Nash equilibria, and finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete. However,
like Nash equilibria in general, Wardrop equilibria do not optimize any global
objective per se. In particular, the total latency of all agents is not minimized
at Wardrop equilibrium. Addressing this issue, Roughgarden and Tardos gave
tight bounds on the price of anarchy measuring the worst-possible inefficiency
of equilibria with respect to the incurred latency. Further, the famous Braess’s
paradox states that adding edges to a network may in fact worsen the unique
equilibrium.
The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of
Wardrop equilibria. We identify several problems whose solution captures the
essence of Wardrop equilibria. All of the problems we analyze find their mo-
tivation in the inefficiency of Wardrop equilibria or the counterintuitive phe-
nomenon of Braess’s paradox. First, we study natural and innovative means
to reduce the price of anarchy. Secondly, we analyze the stability of equilibria
regarding modifications of the network environment. Finally, we propose a
distributed algorithm for computing approximate equilibria.
The inefficiency of equilibria motivates our first line of research. We em-
ploy the elegant theory of mechanism design that provides a large arsenal of
methods for coping with selfish behavior and turn to the question of how to
improve the performance of equilibria. The goal of mechanism design is the
design of protocols that interact with selfish actors following their individ-
ual objective function and steer them to a socially desirable outcome. In the
context of selfish routing most prominent protocols regulate the behavior of
agents by imposing taxes on the network edges. In Wardrop’s model, impos-
ing marginal cost taxes on every edge completely eliminates the inefficiency of
selfish routing. However, in many networks there might be technical or le-
gal restrictions that prevent an operator from imposing a tax on certain edges.
Thus, we concentrate on optimal taxes for the crucial and more realistic case in
which only a given subset of the edges can be taxed. We establish NP-hardness
of this optimization problem in general networks. On the positive side, we
3provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing optimal taxes in parallel
link networks with linear latency functions.
We also propose a novel approach to improve the performance of selfish
flow in networks by additionally routing flow, called auxiliary flow. In oppo-
sition to most well-established concepts designed to deal with negative effects
of selfish behavior, optimal utilization of auxiliary flow is neither detrimental
from an agents’ perspective nor does it assume partly control over the network
infrastructure or the agents. Contrary to classical taxing for instance, optimally
assigning auxiliary flow does not increase the agents’ disutility. We focus on
the computational complexity for the optimal utilization of auxiliary flow and
present strong inapproximability results. In particular, the minimal amount
of auxiliary flow needed to induce an optimal flow as the outcome of selfish
behavior cannot be approximated by any subexponential factor.
Further, we study the sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria. Whereas the notion
of Wardrop equilibrium captures stability in closed systems, traffic is typically
subject to external influences. However, an equilibrium would be a rare event
if it were not sufficiently robust against environmental changes. Thus, from
both the practical and the theoretical perspective it is a natural and intriguing
question, how equilibria respond to slight modifications of either the network
topology or the traffic flow. We show positive and negative results on the
stability of flow pattern and flow characteristics at equilibrium. Remarkably
is our finding, that an arbitrarily small environmental change may well cause
the entire flow to redistribute. We also prove that the flow on every edge and
the unique path latency at equilibrium are stable.
As it is fundamental for the above studies that selfish behavior in network
routing games yields an equilibrium, it is not clear how the set of agents can
attain an equilibrium in the first place. Moreover, the definition of Wardrop
equilibrium requires agents to possess complete knowledge about the game. In
previous work it was shown that an infinite set of selfish agents can approach
Wardrop equilibria quickly by following a simple round-based load-adaptive
rerouting policy relying on very mild assumptions only. We convert this pol-
icy into an efficient, distributed algorithm for computing approximate Wardrop
equilibria for a slightly different setting in which the flow is controlled by a
finite number of agents only each of which aims at balancing the entire flow
of one commodity. We show that an approximate equilibrium in which only
a small fraction of the agents sustains latency significantly above average is
reached in expected polynomial time.

Zusammenfassung
Weltweite Kommunikationsnetzwerke wie das Internet können nicht zentral
gesteuert werden. Benutzer solcher Netzwerke handeln eigennützig, ohne die
Gesamtleistung des Systems zubeachten. Solch komplexe Strukturen führten
zu einem Paradigmenshift in der Informatik. Während traditionelle Konzepte
für überschaubare Netzwerke konzipiert wurden, stellt die nicht-kooperative
Spieltheorie die benötigten Techniken zur Analyse von Verkehr in heutigen
Netzwerken zur Verfügung.
Gegenstand dieser Arbeit sind Gleichgewichtszustände im von Wardrop
in den 1950er Jahren eingeführten Verkehrsmodell. In Wardrops Modell wird
Verkehr als Fluß zwischen Paaren von Knoten in einem Graphen modelliert.
Latenzfunktionen beschreiben die flußabhängigen Latenz einer Kante. Eine
weitverbreitete Interpretation des Modells ist, das unendlich viele Agenten
jeweils einen infinitesimal kleinen Flußbetrag kontrollieren. Die Kosten jedes
Agenten sind genau die Summe der Kantenlatenzen auf dem von ihm gewählten
Pfad. Ein Wardrop Gleichgewicht ist einen Zustand, in dem jeder Agent einen
latenzminimalen Pfad zwischen seinem Start- und Zielknoten gewählt hat. Es
ist bekannt, dass die Netzwerklatenz in Wardrop Gleichgewichten nicht min-
imiert wird. Darüberhinaus zeigt das Braess Paradox, dass das Hinzufügen
von Kapazität die Netzwerkleistung sogar verschlechtern kann.
In dieser Arbeit analysieren wir wichtige Probleme, die zum Verständnis
der Wardrop Gleichgewichte beitragen. Es ist lange bekannt, dass wenn be-
liebige Steuern auf jeder Kante erhoben werden können, ein bezüglich der
Gesamtlatenz optimaler Gleichgewichtsfluss erreicht werden kann. Wir unter-
suchen den Fall, dass Steuern nur auf einigen Kanten erhoben werden kön-
nen. Für beliebige Netzwerke zeigen wir dass optimale Steuern NP-schwer zu
berechnen sind. Auf der anderen Seite präsentieren wir für einfache Netzw-
erkstrukturen einen effizienten Algorithmus. Anschließend führen wir mit
dem Konzept des Hilfsflusses einen alternativen Ansatz zur Verbesserung
von Gleichgewichten ein. Wir konzentrieren uns auf die Komplexität der
wesentlichen damit verbundenen Optimierungsprobleme. In einem weiteren
Kapitel studieren wir die Sensitivität von Wardrop Gleichgewichten bezüglich
6Änderungen entscheidender Netzwerkparameter und erhalten positive und
negative Ergebnisse zu allen wichtigen Gleichgewichtsmerkmalen. Abschließend
analysieren wir wie Agenten mit nur wenig Information ein Gleichgewicht
erreichen können. Basierend auf einer existierenden rundenbasierten Imita-
tionsdynamik entwickeln wir einen verteilten Algorithmus, der in erwarteter
polynomieller Zeit zu einem approximativem Gleichgewicht konvergiert.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet differs in many respects from classical networks studied in com-
puter science. Whereas traditional network optimization proceeds under the
assumption of a central authority that controls the entire network, here the
communication infrastructure is built and governed by a huge number of eco-
nomic entities that interact in an uncoordinated and distributed fashion fol-
lowing their individual interest. The fact that globally optimal solutions are
apparently not viable prompted a paradigmatic change in theoretical com-
puter science. The field of algorithmic game theory resulted from the combina-
tion of classical methods from traditional network optimization and concepts
provided by the framework of game theory.
Following this line of research, we study the game-theoretic traffic model
due to Wardrop [?]. Introduced in the 1950s in the context of road traffic, this
model captures key features of resource sharing among many selfish agents.
It has been utilized to analyze many problems in transportation and commu-
nication networks. Suppose we are given a road network and a large number
of agents traveling through the network from their origin to their destination.
Each agent aims to minimize its experiences travel time, which is the dura-
tion needed to traverse every road segment on the selected route. Here, the
time it takes to traverse a road segment is dependent on both the road seg-
ment’s characteristics and its congestion, i. e., the number of agents using it.
Large-scale communication networks like the Internet provide another sce-
nario of individuals sharing the same network, where congestion effects on
edges generate interdependencies between the routing decisions. More pre-
cisely, in Wardrop’s traffic model a network equipped with non-decreasing
latency functions mapping flow on edges to latencies is given. Between each
of several source-destination pairs a certain amount of flow demand has to be
routed via a collection of paths.
The situation can be described as a non-cooperative game, in which in-
finitely many selfish flow particles (agents) try to allocate a shortest path be-
14 Chapter 1. Introduction
tween their origin-destination vertices. In terms of the examples discussed
above, each agent could represent a vehicle in a highway system or one of the
umpteen packets traversing the world wide web every minute. An important
solution concept for this network game is provided by the theory of Wardrop
equilibria. A Wardrop equilibrium denotes a network flow that incurs equal and
minimal latency on all used paths between a given origin-destination pair. As-
suming that all agents select their strategies independently and rationally, such
a state is a Nash equilibrium [?] as no arbitrary small fraction of the traffic as-
signed to some path can benefit from unilaterally deviating to another path. It
seems only natural to study Wardrop equilibria as they represent stable states
of the game.
Beckmann el al. [?] provided a rigorous mathematical formulation of War-
drop equilibria. They formulated the network equilibrium problem as a con-
vex optimization problem with a single objective function. In this optimization
problem a potential function has to be minimized subject to natural flow con-
straints. This formulation directly yields the existence, the essential unique-
ness and the polynomial time computability of Wardrop equilibria.
Non-cooperative selfish behavior causes a potentially higher cost at equi-
librium than in socially optimal solutions. Addressing this issue, Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [?] initiated investigations of the price of anarchy, which
measures the worst-possible inefficiency of equilibria with respect to a social
welfare measure. In their seminal paper, Roughgarden and Tardos [?] studied
the price of anarchy in the Wardrop model and gave tight bounds for several
classes of networks.
A large fraction of the research on Wardrop’s traffic model is motivated
by the so-called Braess’s paradox. Braess [?] made the seminal observation that
adding extra capacity to a network may change a Wardrop equilibrium in
such a way that every agent experiences a higher latency. This counterintuitive
phenomenon stems from the non-cooperative nature of the agents: every agent
minimizes its individual path latency and does not care about the experienced
latency of the others.
In this thesis, we analyze Wardrop equilibria in several respects. Through-
out our studies, Braess’s original instance and natural extensions will serve as
omnipresent benchmark networks. At first, we study two different ways to re-
duce the price of anarchy. Certainly, the most well-studied approach is known
as taxing. The idea of taxing edges is to charge agents a fee for traversing an
edge. The assumption is that tax and latency can be measured on the same
scale. Agents strive to minimize their disutility, i. e., the experienced latency
plus the sum of the taxes on their chosen path. The classical result states that
imposing marginal cost taxes on every edge induces the social optimum [?]. A
serious drawback of marginal cost pricing is that it requires every edge of the
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network to be taxable, which may not possible for legal or technical reasons.
Further, the process of collecting taxes may require an infrastructure that can
be costly or impossible to establish. We consider the more general case in
which only a given subset of edges may be taxed striving at minimizing the
network wide performance. For this case, we give positive and negative results
on the computational complexity of finding optimal taxes for different classes
of networks.
As mentioned above, the concept of taxing relies on the existence of direct
access to the edges and potentially costly infrastructure. Further, the agents’
disutility is not minimized [?]. Alternative approaches to influence the behav-
ior of selfish agents in networks as network design [?] or Stackelberg routing [?]
require control over the network infrastructure or the agents, respectively.
We elaborate on the conceptually simple idea of influencing network per-
formance by routing additional flow, which is more practicable in many sce-
narios. We distinguish between auxiliary flow and adversarial flow, that may be
utilized to influence the routing decisions of the set of selfish agents in such
a way that the induced equilibrium minimizes/maximizes the total latency of
the selfish flow. Adversarial flow is loosely related to the concept of spam in
the Internet, while auxiliary flow would represent “useful spam”. As attractive
as this approach might seem, we prove several impossibility results for optimal
routings of these additional flows. Interestingly, several of our results on the
computational complexity of taxing subnetworks and optimal auxiliary flow
sharply contrast well-known results derived in the related field of Stackelberg
routing.
Most existing literature in the context of selfish routing based on Wardrop’s
model focuses on the static analysis of equilibria. In the majority of cases,
however, uncoordinated networks are subject to traffic fluctuations. Entities
constantly enter and leave the system, they establish and remove connections
among each other. Braess’s paradox exemplifies that selfish behavior and the
consequences of such fluctuations are non-trivial to predict. Going one step
further, the notion of Wardrop equilibria serves only as a solution concept and
it is not clear how an equilibrium state can be actually reached. For instance,
Braess’s paradox shows that Wardrop equilibria are not computable by a naive
algorithm, that iteratively computes shortest paths for fractions of the flow and
routes the flow accordingly.
We will address these issues in the second and third part of this thesis. Fol-
lowing the line of research of stability and sensitivity analysis that has received
a lot of attention especially after the discovery of Braess’s paradox and many
similarly counterintuitive and counterproductive traffic behavior, we quantify
the changes of the crucial flow characteristics due to modification of the net-
work environment.
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Finally, we study how to approximate Wardrop equilibria in a distributed
fashion. Motivated by the fact that in large networks agents may not have
complete knowledge about the network environment, we show how agents
may learn Wardrop equilibria in a repeated routing game under rather weak
assumptions on the agents’ information about the game. Previous work [?]
considers imitation dynamics in which agents are permitted to imitate each
other concurrently. Following a clever round-based protocol the infinite set
of agents can approach Wardrop equilibria quickly. We transform this proto-
col into a feasible distributed algorithm for computing approximate Wardrop
equilibria and focus on the time until a stable state is reached.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. At first, we briefly
describe fundamental game theoretic concepts. Then we formally introduce
Wardrop’s game-theoretic traffic model. We give an overview of classical re-
sults surrounding Wardrop equilibria and discuss related work. Finally, we
outline the results presented in this dissertation.
1.1 Non-cooperative Game Theory in a Nutshell
The game theoretic concepts introduced in this section provide the necessary
game-theoretic knowledge for the remainder of this thesis.
A finite normal form game (or simply a game) is a tuple of three com-
ponents (N , (Si), (ui)) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the finite set of agents, and
each agent is equipped with a finite set of pure strategies Si and a cost function
ui : ∏i∈N Si → R. Every agent i can either select a pure strategy or, more
generally, a mixed strategy, i. e., it can choose a probability distribution over
its strategy space Si. In a game, we assume that every agent is interested in
minimizing the (expected) cost.
In his seminal dissertation, Nash [?] proposed a solution concept of non-
cooperative equilibrium that later became known as Nash equilibrium. A game
is at Nash equilibrium if no agent can decrease its cost by unilaterally switch-
ing to an alternative strategy. Using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, Nash
proves that such a stable state is guaranteed to exist for all finite non-cooperative
games if the agents are allowed to utilize mixed strategies. In fact, this ground-
breaking result made Nash equilibria the most popular solution concept in
game theory.
The Bach or Stravinsky game shows, that Nash equilibria do not need to be
unique. Two opera lovers want to go to the classical concerto . One prefers
a Bach concert, the other one favors Stravinsky. However, they both rather
like to go to a concert together than on their own. Figure 1.1(a) depicts the
cost matrix. (Negative costs can be considered as positive payoffs.) In Bach
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Bach Stravinsky
Bach -2/-1 0/0
Stravinsky 0/0 -1/-2
(a) Bach and Stravinsky
Heads Tails
Heads 1/-1 -1/1
Tails -1/1 1/-1
(b) Matching Pennies
Figure 1.1: An entry (x/y) at position i,j of the matrix means that Player 1, the row
player, experiences a cost of x and that Player 2, the column player, expe-
riences a cost of y. In (a) there are two pure Nash equilibria, in (b) there is
no pure Nash equilibrium, but only a unique mixed Nash equilibria.
or Stravinsky there are two (pure) Nash equilibria: the joint visits of Bach or
Stravinsky.
Pure strategy Nash equilibria, however, are not guaranteed to exist even in
very simple games. In the Matching Pennies Game two people simultaneously
decide which side of a coin to show. One wins if they both show the same
side, the other wins if one shows “heads” and the other one shows “tails”.
The looser of the game has to pay off the winner. The game matrix is shown in
Figure 1.1(b). Both people know their own strategy, but are totally uncertain
about the opponents’ strategy. At the unique Nash equilibrium both people
play both strategies with probability 1/2.
Its one peculiarity of matching pennies that costs add up to zero. For the
special class of finite normal form games with this property, namely for non-
cooperative two agent zero-sum games in which the costs of the agents add
up to zero for every possible strategy selection von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [?], the founder of game theory, had proposed so-called minimax solutions,
i. e., solutions were each agent minimizes its maximum possible loss.
1.2 Wardrop's Traffic Model
The problem of resource sharing has a long history in the transportation sci-
ences and economics. As early as in the midst of the 19th century Kohl [?], a
German geographer, studied the time and money consuming issue of moving
people and goods between different places in the context of urban planning.
Congestion effects have been explicitly factored in by Pigou [?] and Knight [?]
in the 1920s, who qualitatively described selfish routing in transportation net-
works and observed that selfish behavior does not necessarily maximize the
overall performance. Wardrop [?] introduced a formal model for selfish be-
havior in road networks. Since its publication 1956, Wardrop’s versatile traffic
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model became widely accepted within the transportation sciences. Over the
last decades, Wardrop’s traffic model has been reinvestigated by theoretical
computer scientists since it is also well-suited for the analysis of digital traffic
in communication networks. Now we will describe Wardrop’s traffic model
formally.
An instance of the Wardrop routing game is given by a tuple (G, d). G =
(V, E) denotes a directed multi-graph with latency functions ` = (`e)e∈E
`e : R≥0 → R≥0
attached to the edges. We assume the latency functions to be non-decreasing,
differentiable and semi-convex, i. e., that x · `e(x) is convex. We explicitly men-
tion if E is equipped with latency function different from `. Furthermore,
we are given a set of commodities [k] = {1, . . . , k} specified by source-sink
pairs (si, ti) ∈ V × V and flow demands di, where we can assume without
loss of generality pairwise disjoint sets (si, ti) for i ∈ [k]. The total demand is
d = ∑i∈[k] di. We call an instance single-commodity if k = 1 and multi-commodity
if k > 1. Considering single-commodity instances, we drop the index i and set
d = d1.
Let Pi denote the admissible acyclic paths of commodity i, i. e., all acyclic
paths connecting si and ti, and let P = ⋃i∈[k] Pi. For P ∈ P let fP denote the
volume of agents on path P. A path flow vector ( fP)P∈P induces an edge flow
vector ( fe,i)e∈E,i∈[k] with fe,i = ∑P∈Pi :e∈P fP. The total flow on edge e is
fe = ∑
i∈[k]
fe,i = ∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pi :e∈P
fP = ∑
P3e
fP .
The latency of an edge e ∈ E is given by `e( fe). The total latency of an edge e is
given by `e( fe) · fe. Slightly abusing notation, we denote ( fP)P∈P , ( fe,i)e∈E,i∈[k]
and ( fe)e∈E by f . A flow f is feasible either if fP ≥ 0 for P ∈ P and it satisfies
the flow demands
∑
P∈Pi
fP = di
for all i ∈ [k], or if it is induced by such a path flow. In this thesis, we only
consider the set of feasible flows denoted by F . The latency of a path P ∈ P
is given by the sum of the edge latencies
`P( f ) = ∑
e∈P
`e( fe) .
Note that the path latency is not a function of the corresponding path flow,
because it depends on the total flow on each of its edges.
Definition 1 (Total latency). The total latency of a flow f is defined as
C( f ) = ∑
P∈P
`P( f ) fP . (1.1)
1.2 Wardrop's Traffic Model 19
We drop the argument f whenever it is clear from the context.
Since the edge latency depends solely on the edge flow, the total latency
can also be expressed in terms of edge flows only:
C( f ) = ∑
P∈P
(
∑
e∈P
`e( fe)
)
fP = ∑
e∈E
(
∑
P∈P :e∈P
fP
)
`e( fe) = ∑
e∈E
`e( fe) fe .
1.2.1 Wardrop Equilibria
A natural goal for a central authority is to compute a routing f that minimizes
the total latency over all commodities. This min-cost flow problem can be
formulated as the following non-linear program:
min
f∈F
C( f ) ,
where the feasible set F can be expressed by a polynomial number of flow
conservation and non-negativity constraints. Since the latency functions are
continuous, F is a compact set and an optimal flow exists. Since `(x) · x is
convex, we can apply the concepts of convex programming and can use, e. g.,
the ellipsoid method [?] to compute an optimal flow up to a small error term in
time polynomial in the size of the instance and the number of bits of precision.
This error term is unavoidable since the description of an optimal solution may
require irrational numbers even if the input contains only natural numbers.
For solving the classical problem of efficiently computing a minimum cost
multi-commodity flow, there are also several specific algorithms known. For
an overview see, e. g., [?] and [?]. Note that polynomial time computability
relies crucially on the semi-convexity of the latency function, as for the general
multi-commodity case no fast algorithms are known.
Taking the game theoretic perspective, we envision the flow as composed of
an infinite number of agents each of which carries an infinitesimal amount of
flow. Each agent plays a pure strategy in selecting one path from its origin to its
destination, where the agent’s cost is the chosen path’s latency. Adjusting the
definition of Nash equilibria to games with infinitely many agents we require
that no arbitrarily small fraction of the agents can be shifted from their path to
another without increasing their latency.
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium). A feasible flow f is at Nash equilibrium if for
every commodity i ∈ [k], all paths fP1, fP2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0, and every 0 ≤ ε ≤ fP1
it holds that
`P1( f ) ≤ `P2( f˜ ) ,
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where f˜ is obtained from f by shifting an amount of ε from P1 to P2, i. e.,
f˜P =

fP − ε if P = P1
fP + ε if P = P2
fP otherwise.
Since the latency functions are continuous and non-decreasing, a flow at
Nash equilibrium can be nicely characterized as a flow obeying the “First Prin-
ciple of Wardrop” [?] or being at Wardrop equilibrium. A flow is at Wardrop
equilibrium if all used paths of the same commodity have minimal latency
whereas unused paths may have larger latency.
Lemma 1. A feasible flow f is at Nash equilibrium if and only if for every commodity
i ∈ [k] and all paths fP1, fP2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0 it holds that
`P1( f ) ≤ `P2( f ) .
The total latency of flows at Wardrop equilibrium can easily be expressed,
which will come in handy several times throughout this thesis.
Lemma 2. The total latency of a flow f at Wardrop equilibrium can be expressed as
C( f ) = ∑
i∈[k]
Li( f ) · di ,
where Li( f ) denotes the unique path latency of an equilibrium flow in commodity i.
Note that Wardrop equilibria and Nash equilibria are two related paradigms
that describe a stable network flow as a function of environmental character-
istics. Yet, for arbitrary latency functions Wardrop equilibria and Nash equi-
libria do not coincide. Consider the network shown in Figure 1.2(a). If half
of the demand is being routed over both links each, the flow is at Wardrop
equilibrium. However, sending the entire flow over the lower link constitutes
the unique Nash equilibrium. In Figure 1.2(b), the unique Nash equilibrium is
reached if 2/3 of the flow routes over the upper edge and 1/3 over the lower
edge with the non-continuous latency function, even though the path latencies
differ, and the flow is not at Wardrop equilibrium. In fact, there is no Wardrop
equilibrium for this routing instance. We conclude that our assumptions of
continuity and monotonicity of the latency functions are necessary and suffi-
cient for Lemma 1 to hold.
Moreover, these assumptions are reasonable in applications where cost typ-
ically represents a quantity that only increases with the network congestion,
delay being the prime example.
Wardrop equilibria and optimal flows exhibit a striking similarity. Both
flows are Nash equilibria with respect to a different set of latency functions.
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Figure 1.2: A unit demand needs to be routed from s to t. The edges are labeled with
their latency functions, where g(x) = x for x ≤ 1/3 and g(x) = 1 for
x > 1/3. In (a) Wardrop equilibrium and Nash equilibrium differ. In (b)
no Wardrop equilibrium exists.
Definition 3 (Marginal cost function). If ` is a differentiable function, then
`∗(x) = d
dx
(x · `(x)) = `(x) + `′(x) x
denotes the corresponding marginal cost function.
Note that the marginal cost function of a latency function `e consists of two
terms `e(x) and `′e(x) x. The first captures the per-unit latency incurred by
additional flow whereas the second accounts for the per-unit increased latency
of the flow that is already using the edge.
Theorem 3. [?, ?] Let (G, d) be an instance with latency functions `e for all e ∈
E. Then a flow f is optimal with respect to (`e)e∈E if and only if f is at Wardrop
equilibrium with respect to (`∗e )e∈E.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 3 is the following. For contradiction,
assume that a minimal latency flow uses paths with suboptimal marginal costs.
Hence, there are paths P1, P2 ∈ P with fP1 > 0 and `∗P1( f ) > `∗P2( f ). Since the
marginal costs are continuous `∗P1( f − δ) > `∗P2( f + δ) holds for a sufficiently
small δ > 0. However, this flow shift changes the total latency by (−`P1( f ) +
`P2( f )) · δ < 0.
Theorem 3 establishes not only a deep connection between optimal flows
and Wardrop equilibria but in fact yields an important existence and unique-
ness result.
Theorem 4. [?] The set of Wardrop equilibria coincides with the set of solutions of
the following convex program:
min
f∈F ∑e∈E
∫ fe
0
`e(u) du .
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Thus, every instance (G, d) admits a Wardrop equilibrium and every Wardrop equilib-
rium induces the same edge latencies. Further, a Wardrop equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time.
This theorem holds even for latency function that are not semi-convex. Par-
ticularly useful is the fact that the objective function Φ( f ) = ∑e∈E
∫ fe
0 `e(u) du
serves as a potential function as it precisely absorbs progress: If an infinitesi-
mal amount of flow du is shifted from path P1 to P2, thus improving its la-
tency by `P1 − `P2 , the potential decreases by (`P1 − `P2)du. We will make use
of this fact frequently. The existence of a potential function is sufficient to
guarantee the existence of at least one Wardrop equilibrium. Let f be a flow
minimizing the potential function Φ. If an infinitesimal amount of flow du is
shifted from path P1 to path P2, transforming the flow f to f ′, it follows that
`P2 − `P1 = Φ( f ′)− Φ( f ) ≥ 0. Hence, the fraction of deviating agents could
not benefit from the migration move.
Since Wardrop equilibria are guaranteed to exist in pure strategies, they
constitute the most appealing solution concept. However, there are routing
scenarios that do not satisfy common game theoretic assumptions needed for
the motivation of Wardrop equilibria such as accurate knowledge of the net-
work and its latency functions. Further, agents may incur some costs when
they change their strategy. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that an agent only
switches its path for a significant latency gain. This assumption leads to the
notion of a popular, slightly weaker notion of Wardrop equilibria. A (1 + ε)-
approximate Wardrop equilibrium is a state in which no arbitrary small fraction of
agents can reduce their latency by more than a multiplicative factor of (1+ ε)
by unilaterally migrating to another path. We will comment on several alter-
native solution concepts in Section 1.6.8.
1.3 The Price of Anarchy
It is well-known in economics and in traditional game theory that selfish be-
havior can yield a socially suboptimal outcome. The famous Prisoner’s dilemma
exemplifies this. Two people are arrested by the police being suspected of a
crime. They are interrogated separately and simultaneously such that they
have no chance to communicate or to coordinate their statements. Both sus-
pects can either confess the crime or deny having done anything. If both
confess, they are sentenced to go to prison for 5 years each. If both deny, they
go to prison for only 1 year each because of lack of clear evidence. However, if
they choose different strategies, the confessor is released and the denier is sent
to prison for 8 years (see Figure 1.3(a)). At the unique Nash equilibrium, both
suspects confess the crime. In terms of the total number of years or the maxi-
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Confess Deny
Confess 5/5 8/0
Deny 0/8 1/1
s t
x
1
Figure 1.3: (a) Nash equilibria in the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be arbitrarily bad. (b) A
unit demand needs to routed from s to t. The edges are labeled with their
latency functions `1 and `2. At equilibrium the entire demand utilizes the
upper edge. Socially desirable, however, is splitting traffic evenly among
both paths
mum number of years spent in prison denying the crime is the socially optimal
(from the suspects’ point of view) strategy for both suspects. The equilibrium
situation degrades arbitrarily by increasing the sentences in case of confession.
In the context of selfish routing the degradation of performance was al-
ready observed by Pigou [?]. Braess [?] noticed that selfish behavior can in fact
be worse for all agents. Interestingly, the natural problem of quantifying this
degradation as not been addressed explicitly before the rise of the Internet. In
1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [?] proposed to investigate the coordina-
tion ratio which they defined as the worst case ratio between the social cost at
Nash equilibrium and the optimal social cost. Later, Papadimitriou [?] dubbed
this measure the price of anarchy.
Note that there are obvious structural similarities to other established con-
cepts in theoretical computer science. In particular, the notion of the price of
anarchy is related to the approximation ratio measuring the performance loss
due to lack of computational power of approximation algorithms [?] and to
the competitive ratio measuring the performance loss due to lack of perfect
information of online algorithms [?]. In the same spirit the price of anarchy
quantifies the loss of performance due to lack of a central authority. A small
price of anarchy indicates that every equilibrium is a good approximation of a
socially optimal state.
Over the last ten years, equilibrium efficiency analyses have been con-
ducted in a large variety of games, such as job scheduling, facility location and
network design (for an extensive overview see [?]). Arguably routing games
are among the most successfully analyzed applications. In Wardrop routing
games the total latency L( f ) is the most common performance measure.
Definition 4 (Price of anarchy). [?,?] The price of anarchy for an instance (G, d)
is defined as
ρ(G, d) = C( f
∗)
C( f )
,
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where f and f ∗ denote an optimal flow and an equilibrium flow, respectively. The price
of anarchy for a set of instances I is
ρ(I) = sup
(G,d)∈I
ρ(G, d) .
Note that by Theorem 4 every Wardrop equilibrium incurs the same total
latency and the price of anarchy is well-defined.
Pigou’s example [?] (Figure 1.3(b)) exemplifies that selfish routing does not
optimize social welfare in general. Assume there is one unit of traffic routing
itself from s to t. At the unique equilibrium every agent routes via the upper
edge which incurs a total latency of 1. Following Theorem 3 the minimum cost
flow solves `∗1( f1) = `
∗
2(1− f1), which holds if the flow is split evenly. While
the agents on the upper edge experience a latency of 1/2, the agents on the
lower edge incur a latency of 1. This minimum cost flow incurs a total latency
of 1/2 · 1/2+ 1/2 · 1 = 3/4. The minimum cost flow is not at equilibrium since
a small fraction of selfish agents currently using the lower edge experiences a
latency of 1 and could improve their latency by switching to the upper edge.
A switch would deteriorate the total latency since it would slightly increase
the latency of a large fraction of the selfish agents. Thus, the fact the agents
ignore the latency increase their decisions imposes on the other agents is the
reason why equilibria are inefficient in general. In Pigou’s example, the price
of anarchy is 13/4 = 4/3. The inefficiency can be amplified by changing the
non-constant latency function to `1(x) = xp for some large integer p > 0. The
equilibrium flow remains the same, but in the optimal flow almost all agents
are routed over the upper edge and the total latency vanishes for large p. The
price of anarchy can be computed as roughly p/ log p.
In their ground-breaking work Roughgarden and Tardos [?] analyze the
price of anarchy in Wardrop’s model. In fact, they show that the price of an-
archy equals 4/3 for linear latency functions and Θ(p/ log p) for polynomial
latency functions with non-negative coefficients of degree at most p. Later, im-
proved bounds on the price of anarchy for special classes of polynomial latency
functions were given [?] . Whereas the set of latency functions were identified
as the crucial parameter for the price of anarchy, the network topology is ir-
relevant [?, ?]. In particular, Roughgarden [?] presents a simple procedure for
computing the price of anarchy by proving that the worst-case ratio is already
achieved on parallel links (see also Correa et al. [?]). Observe that in this
regard Pigou’s example depicted in Figure 1.3(b) exhibits the worst possible
price of anarchy among all networks with polynomial latency functions. Com-
plementing the result that the inefficiency of equilibria cannot be bounded in
general, Roughgarden and Tardos [?] show that the total latency at Wardrop
equilibrium is upper bounded by the total latency of an optimal flow rout-
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Figure 1.4: Again a unit demand needs to be routed from s to t. In the left network
optimal solution and equilibrium coincide and traffic is split among both
paths. After adding an extra edge, at equilibrium the flow utilizes the
zig-zag-path incurring a higher latency.
ing twice the demand. In the special case with latency functions of the form
`e( fe) + `′e( fe) · fe = C · `e( fe) for all e ∈ E and some constant C > 0, the price
of anarchy equals 1 [?]. In an inverse line of research, Roughgarden [?] an-
alyzes the unfairness of the optimal solution in terms of the worst case ratio
between a path latency at optimum and at Wardrop equilibrium. By definition
the price of anarchy is a worst case measure. Like other traditional worst case
measures in theoretical computer science it has often been criticized for being
too pessimistic. For a promising approach of average case analysis of the price
of anarchy see [?].
1.4 Braess's Paradox
A famous result on selfish routing in congested networks is the so-called Braess
paradox. Braess [?] made the astonishing observation that adding extra capacity
to a network may change a Wardrop equilibrium in such a way that every agent
experiences a higher latency.
Consider the small network depicted in Figure 1.4(a). As in Pigou’s exam-
ple assume one unit of selfish traffic traveling from s to t. At equilibrium (and
optimum) half of the agents take the upper path while the other half selects
the lower path. In this case, the experienced path latency of every agent (and
the total latency) is 3/2. The addition of an edge as shown in Figure 1.4(b)
yields Braess’s original network. Now the entire flow uses the zig-zag-path
at equilibrium, which increases the path latency of every agent (and the total
latency) to 2.
Braess’s Paradox fueled a huge amount of research up to today. Many
researchers elaborated on Braess’s Paradox in the Wardrop model [?,?,?,?] and
related models [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. Braess’s Paradox further prompted the search for
other counterintuitive observations in traffic networks [?, ?, ?, ?].
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Roughgarden [?] gave results on the severeness of this phenomenon in the
Wardrop model. In networks with n vertices removing a set of edges may
decrease the total latency by a factor of bn/2c, which gives a tight bound.
By removing at most k edges from a given network, the total latency can be
improved by at most a factor of k + 1. Yet, since for networks with linear
latency functions the price of anarchy equals 4/3 [?], Braess’s original four
vertex network exhibits the worst case manifestation of Braess’s paradox for
this class of networks. Even though Braess’s paradox is common in large
random graphs [?, ?], it is hard to detect [?].
We want to emphasize that Braess’s paradox is far from being merely an
academic curiosity, as it has been observed many times in large road networks.
For instance, the (temporal) closure of central roads in highly jammed traffic
areas around the globe improved the total traffic flow notably [?, ?, ?]. In an
analytical approach, Youn et al. [?] estimated the price of anarchy with respect
to the travel times in road networks of several major cities to be roughly 1.3
and identified several roads, whose closure may improve traffic situation.
Remarkably, the occurrence of Braess’s Paradox is not confined to selfish
behavior. Similar effects have been observed in mechanical and electronic sys-
tems [?], indicating that also physical equilibrium principles do not always
pilot the network system to optimal states.
As another line of research stimulated by the paradoxical behavior of self-
ish routing, stability and sensitivity analysis of equilibrium traffic character-
istics have received a lot of attention. The outstanding result by Dafermos
and Nagurney [?,?] states that equilibrium flow patterns depend continuously
upon the demands and latency functions. In other words, small changes in the
travel demands or in the latency functions induce small changes in the edge
flows, path flows, and path latency at Wardrop equilibrium. In particular, for
single-commodity networks the path latency at equilibrium is a monotone in-
creasing function of the input demand. Further, they identified the structure
of networks in which Braess’s paradox occurs.
1.5 Reducing the Price of Anarchy
A large portion of current research is dedicated to quantifying the price of
anarchy in Wardrop’s traffic model. While this work is vital, it is even more
valuable to design methods to reduce the inefficiency of selfish flow in scenar-
ios with no central control. To this end, several approaches have been studied.
Generally, the goal is to design a protocol that interacts with selfish agents fol-
lowing their individual objective and steer their incentives to a socially desir-
able outcome. In this section we will summarize known results about methods
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to reduce the price of anarchy. We focus on introducing taxes [?, ?], designing
“good” networks [?] and controlling a subset of the agents centrally [?].
1.5.1 Taxes
In the context of selfish routing most prominent protocols regulate the equilib-
rium by the utilization of economic means in form of taxes. The idea of taxing
is to charge agents a fee for traversing an edge. In other words, a tax τe ≥ 0
on an edge e ∈ E raises the perceived disutility from `e( fe) to `e( fe) + τe.
Subsequently, every agent selects a path minimizing its disutility, i. e., its expe-
rienced latency plus the sum of the taxes on the chosen path. The effectiveness
of such taxes has been observed by Pigou [?] and generalized by Beckmann
et al. [?]. Theorem 3 yields the fundamental result that imposing marginal cost
taxes τe = `′e( fe) · fe induces the social optimum [?], where f denotes an opti-
mal flow. In other words, if each agent on the edge has to pay a tax equal to
the additional cost its presence causes for the other agents on the edge, one
entirely eradicates the inefficiency of selfish behavior. This classic result holds
since the agents are homogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to taxes. If
we generalize the model to the heterogeneous case in which every agent trades
off money and time in an individual manner and minimizes a weighted sum
of the edge latencies and the edge taxes, marginal cost taxing does not remain
optimal. Early work on taxes for heterogeneous agents considered unsatisfying
agent-specific taxes on the edges [?, ?, ?]. Later, Cole et al. [?] were the first
to consider the problem from the view of theoretical computer science. They
give a non-constructive existence proof for taxes stabilizing the optimal flow in
single-commodity networks and upper bound the size of the maximal tax nec-
essary. Fleischer [?] reduces the bounded on the required taxes to linear func-
tions and gives an algorithm for computing optimal taxes for series-parallel
networks. In following work, the existence of taxes was proved constructively
for multi-commodity networks [?,?,?]. Even more, Fleischer et al. [?] shows the
existence of taxes that induce optimal flows for several alternative objectives,
such as minimum average weighted latency and minimum maximum latency.
The underlying assumption of the above mentioned work is that taxes can
be returned to the agents and therefore the network performance is deter-
mined entirely by the total latency. However, there may arise situations, in
which the refunding process could be costly or infeasible. In this case we need
to consider non-refundable taxes, that minimize the total disutility (latency plus
taxes) of the agents. Under this assumption, marginal cost pricing does not
improve the cost of Wardrop equilibria for linear latency functions [?] . But
alternative tax functions can still be beneficial as the Braess network exempli-
fies. In networks with linear latency functions there are optimal taxes that are
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either 0 or ∞ on each edge [?]. Still, optimal taxes are hard to approximate [?].
Whereas for networks equipped with linear latency functions the trivial algo-
rithm, i. e., imposing no taxes at all, yields a 4/3-approximation of the social
optimum [?], it is NP-hard to approximate the social optimum within (4/3− ε)
for every ε > 0.
1.5.2 Network Design
Braess’s paradox shows that removing edges from a network may improve equi-
librium performance. More precisely, in networks with n vertices removing a
set of edges may decrease the total latency by a factor of bn/2c [?]. How-
ever, this approach is restricted since it does not even reduce the price of
anarchy on parallel links networks. Roughgarden [?] considered the com-
putational complexity of detecting a subnetwork of a given network with n
vertices exhibiting the best equilibrium and presented inapproximability re-
sults and naive optimal approximation algorithms. In particular, whereas a
(n/2 − ε)-approximation algorithm is NP-hard to compute, the trivial algo-
rithm, i. e., choosing the entire network as the optimal subnetwork, is a n/2-
approximation. Note that by imposing a sufficiently large tax on an edge one
can simulate the removal of that edge. Thus, the network design problem can
be seen as a special case of the taxing problem. As Roughgarden [?] points out,
in selfish routing the difference between linear and nonlinear latency functions
is most often only quantitative, as bounds on the price of anarchy show. Yet,
there is a qualitative gap in the relative power of taxes to the power of edge
removals. When moving from linear to non-linear latency functions. While for
linear latency functions edge removal is as powerful as taxing [?], the benefit of
taxes exceeds the benefit through edge removal by O (n) for non-linear latency
functions.
1.5.3 Stackelberg Routing
Taxing and network design intend to reduce the price of anarchy by directly
modifying the network topology. Stackelberg routing [?] is an alternative ap-
proach to mitigate the negative effects of selfish behavior in congested net-
works. The idea of Stackelberg routing is to route a fraction of flow centrally
such that the latency of all flow is optimized at equilibrium. In Stackelberg
routing, one assumes that an ε-fraction of the demand is controlled by a cen-
tral authority, the Stackelberg leader, while the remaining (1− ε)-fraction is
controlled by non-atomic selfish agents. In a first phase, the Stackelberg leader
fixes the routes for its fraction of the demand. In a second phase, the selfish
agents enter the system and route their own flow on top of the leader demand.
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The objective of the leader is to minimize the resulting total cost of the total
(both leader and selfish) flow, while the selfish agents solely aim to minimize
their experienced path latency. One important application of Stackelberg rout-
ing is the routing of Internet traffic within the domain of an Internet service
provider [?]. Here, the Internet service provider centrally controls a fraction of
the overall traffic traversing its domain.
The problem of the computational complexity of an optimal leader strat-
egy is essentially solved. An optimal leader strategy is NP-hard to compute
even for parallel links with linear latency functions [?] but the problem allows
an FPTAS [?]. There are polynomial time algorithms to compute the minimal
portion of flow needed by the leader to induce optimum cost [?] and the min-
imal value of the Stackelberg leader’s demand that can improve the price of
anarchy [?]. On the algorithmic side, Roughgarden [?] introduces an easy-to-
implement Stackelberg strategy that reduces the price of anarchy for arbitrary
latency functions on parallel links to a constant factor of 1/ε. Thus, by con-
trolling only a small amount of flow, the performance of equilibria can be dra-
matically improved. This does not remain true in arbitrary single-commodity
networks [?]. On the positive side, Swamy [?] presents latency-class specific
bounds on the price of anarchy in arbitrary multi-commodity networks. The
obtained bounds yield a continuous trade-off between the amount of flow con-
trolled and the price of anarchy (see also [?]).
1.6 Extensions and Variations
Wardrop’s traffic model was originally introduced in [?] to model selfish be-
havior in road networks. Since it is also well-suited for the analyses of uncoor-
dinated communication networks like the Internet, the model has attracted the
interest of theoretical computer scientists over the last 10 years. In this section,
we review various ramifications and extensions of the model that have been
analyzed and outline the results that have been obtained therein.
1.6.1 Nonatomic Routing Games
In Wardrop routing games the action of a every agent has essentially no ef-
fect on the choices of the other agents. Games that possess this property are
referred to as nonatomic. General nonatomic non-cooperative games have been
introduced by Schmeidler [?] in the early 1970s. A nonatomic game is defined
as a game in which a continuum of agents is equipped with a nonatomic mea-
sure. Strategies and cost functions can be defined similarly as for finite normal
form games. However, in the case of infinitely many agents we do not need to
differentiate between pure and mixed strategies. Schmeidler [?] gave existence
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proofs for equilibria, thereby greatly generalizing the results on the existence
of Wardrop equilibria [?] as stated in Theorem 4.
Whereas general nonatomic games are a very general concept, Wardrop’s
traffic model exhibits a much richer structure. Firstly, the strategy set of the
agents is quite restricted as it contains only paths between the respective
sources and sinks. Secondly, and more importantly, the latency of an edge
does not depend on the identities but only on the measure of agents choosing
this edge. The latter is indeed one of the main characteristics of congestion
sensitive networks in general.
1.6.2 Congestion Games
Wardrop’s model assumes an infinite number of agents. In some real-world
applications, however, there are a finite number of agents competing for shared
resources. To suitably model these situations Rosenthal [?] introduced conges-
tion games in 1973. In a congestion game there are given a finite set of resources
and a finite set of agents of non-negligible size. Each agents’ strategy consists
of a subset of the resources. The cost of a strategy is the sum of the latencies
of the chosen resources, and the cost for choosing a resource depends only on
the number of agents including this resource in their strategy sets. Congestion
games are a discrete version of Wardrop games.
Rosenthal [?] provided a potential function for congestion games proving
the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In fact, the class of congestion games
coincides with the rich and broad class of potential games [?]. Rosenthal’s po-
tential function resembles the potential function given by Beckmann et al. [?]
for the Wardrop model, but the potential function yields a non-convex opti-
mization problem that allows for multiple pure Nash solutions. Correspond-
ingly, congestion games allow for multiple equilibria. Further, in congestion
games a Nash equilibrium can be achieved without incurring the same latency
to all agents, contrary to the “First principle of Wardrop”. On the positive
side, Rosenthal’s work implied that sequential best-response dynamics in con-
gestion games converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.
While Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently, it is PLS-complete
to compute a pure Nash equilibrium [?] in congestion games, i. e., there is
no efficient algorithm for computing pure Nash equilibria unless PLS ⊆ P.
This also holds for linear cost functions [?]. Skopalik and Vöcking [?] prove
that even pure (1 + ε)-approximate Nash equilibria, i. e., states in which no
agent can decrease its latency by more than a factor of (1 + ε) by unilaterally
changing its strategy, are PLS-complete to compute. On the other hand, ap-
proximate equilibria in congestion games in which the strategy spaces of the
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agents coincide (symmetric congestion games) can be computed efficiently under
mild smoothness conditions on the latency functions [?].
Most related to Wardrop routing games are network congestion games. In
network congestion games the strategy sets of the agents are presented im-
plicitly as paths in a network. Fabrikant et al. [?] show that Nash equilibria
are efficiently computable for symmetric network congestion games using a
reduction to min-cost flow. However (1 + ε)-approximate Nash equilibria are
still PLS-complete to compute in general network congestion games [?]. Feld-
mann et al. [?] identify properties that latency functions from natural classes
have to satisfy in order to guarantee that an approximate Nash equilibrium
can be computed in polynomial time.
As in the Wardrop model, in congestion games the degradation with re-
spect to the total latency due to selfish behavior is well understood. The price
of anarchy for linear latency functions is 5/2 and pΘ(p) for polynomial latency
functions of degree p [?, ?]. Aland et al. [?] give the exact price of anarchy
for polynomial latency functions. Note that the price of anarchy in conges-
tion games is much larger than in the Wardrop model. In both cases the set
of allowed latency functions the crucial parameter and the price of anarchy is
independent of the network topology.
A wide range of results for special classes of congestion games and a variety
of social cost functions have been studied ( [?,?,?,?,?,?]). For instance, the price
of anarchy for parallel links with linear latency functions with respect to the
maximum latency is Θ(log m/ log log m) [?].
As an alternative game-theoretic measure to the price of anarchy, Anshele-
vich et al. [?] introduced the price of stability as a worst-case ratio, over all
instances, between the social cost of the best equilibrium (instead of the worst)
and optimum social cost. The idea is that if a central authority is enabled to
initially set up a solution that selfish agents are free to adopt subsequently, the
best equilibrium is the prime selection. In other words, the price of stability
measures the inevitable performance degradation due to the selfishness of the
agents. First work shows, that for linear latency functions the price of stability
is approximately 8/5 [?]. For results in related models see [?, ?, ?, ?].
Despite the considerable interest in optimal tax functions for congestion
games [?, ?, ?], it is - unlike in Wardrop’s model- still unknown whether there
exist optimal taxes for atomic congestion games.
1.6.3 Splittable Flow
In a natural generalization of Wardrop’s model, finitely many agents control a
non-negligible fraction of the entire demand each. One interpretation of this
setting is that agents of a commodity form coalitions to reduce the expected
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latency faced by the agents in the coalition, under the assumption that all
agents within a coalition are randomly assigned to the different paths used by
the coalition. Motivating scenarios are route guidance systems recommending
optimal routes to its users or freight companies dictating transportation routes
to its truck fleet. Observe that the Wardrop model emerges as a special case in
which infinitely many agents are allowed, each of them controlling a negligible
amount of flow. Orda et al. [?] introduced this model and showed that Nash
equilibria exist under certain conditions. Uniqueness results were obtained
only for some special cases [?, ?, ?]. In fact, this model allows for multiple
equilibria in general [?] even for only two players.
In this model the price of anarchy is not well understood yet. Some finite
upper bounds on the price of anarchy for polynomial latency functions of low
degrees are known [?, ?], but there is still a large gap between known upper
and lower bounds for polynomial latency functions of arbitrary degree [?, ?].
The price of anarchy in congestion games with splittable flow can be worse
than in the Wardrop game [?].
In light of the possibility of multiple equilibria [?], the situation with regard
to taxing seems worse than in the Wardrop case. Nevertheless, there exists an
optimal tax function for multi-commodity networks even in the presence of
heterogeneous agents, in the sense that the optimal solution is realized as some
equilibrium via taxes ( [?], see also [?, ?]). Hay et al. [?] consider collusion
games, a variant of splittable flow games in which agents traveling between a
source-sink pair may form arbitrary coalitions and measure the degradation
of performance due to this behavior.
1.6.4 General Latency Functions
Wardrop’s model has been extended over the years in various manners. Stick-
ing to an infinite number of agents, one straightforward way is to allow more
general latency functions. Following this line, agent-specific latency functions
allow to model agents with different preferences. Gairing et al. . [?] concen-
trate on existence results of equilibria and give bounds on the price of anar-
chy. Agent-specific latency functions have also been considered in congestion
games [?, ?].
Most of the literature on Wardrop’s traffic model deals with the case of
separable latency functions, i. e., the latency of an edge depends only on the
amount of flow on this edge. It is, however, reasonable to assume that the
amount of flow on other edges influences the latency of every edge to a certain
extent. Non-separable latency functions account for this dependency as they are
functions of the entire vector of edge latencies. Dafermos and Nagurney [?]
prove existence of equilibria for this kind of latency functions (see also [?, ?]).
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For results on the price of anarchy for non-separable latency function s ee [?,
?, ?].
A more accurate description of traffic flows can be obtained by introducing
edge capacities [?, ?, ?, ?]. In this model multiple equilibria are possible and the
price of anarchy becomes unbounded even for linear latency functions. How-
ever, the best equilibrium is still as efficient as in absence of edge capacities [?].
1.6.5 Non-Increasing Latency Functions
Throughout this work, we assume the latency functions on the edges to be
continuous and non-decreasing. The remark following Lemma 2 highlights
that these assumptions are necessary (and in fact sufficient) for flows obeying
the “First Principle of Wardrop” to be at Nash equilibrium. Further, these as-
sumptions seem reasonable in real-world applications, because in congestion
dependent networks the latency mostly represents delay. However, applica-
tions such as multi-cast routing with multiple duplication of flow motivate
the analysis of selfish routing in the presence of strictly non-increasing latency
functions [?]. As it turns out, this model exhibits rather demotivating charac-
teristics. Equilibria are not unique, and an optimal flow is not approximable
by selfish behavior even for linear latency functions in a small network with
only six vertices.
1.6.6 Maximum Latency, Bottleneck and Elastic Demands
In the vast majority of the literature on the Wardrop model, the network per-
formance is measured in total latency. As can be observed in Pigou’s exam-
ple in Figure 1.3(b), a flow minimizing total latency may be unfair from the
agents’ perspective [?]. In order to attain a system optimal routing, some
agents may take costly detours that reduce the congestion encountered by the
others. This unfairness makes such a solution unattractive for the affected
agents. Arguably, the most intuitive way to establish a higher degree of fair-
ness is to minimize the maximum latency incurred by a user. The price of
anarchy for the maximum path latency as social cost has been considered by
several researchers [?,?,?,?]. For single-commodity networks the price of anar-
chy is n− 1 [?], contrasting results for the total latency. For multi-commodity
instances the situation is worse as even the removal of a single edge may de-
crease the maximum latency by a factor of 2O(n) [?].
An underlying assumption in Wardrop’s traffic model is that the agents’
performance is determined by the sum of edge latencies. However, there are
many practical scenarios in which the agents follow bottleneck objectives [?],
i. e., performance is determined by the worst component (highest edge la-
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tency). Note that in Wardrop’s setting the bottleneck latency of a path corre-
sponds to the ∞-norm of the vector of edge latencies whereas the total latency
equals the 1-norm. More generally, Cole et al. [?] focus on selfish routing
networks under the p-norm for 1 < p ≤ ∞ and give several performance guar-
antees of equilibria. In particular, for single-commodity the price of anarchy
under the p-norm for 1 < p < ∞ is bounded by the price of anarchy with
respect to the total latency (i. e., under the 1-norm), but for multi-commodity
networks the price of anarchy under the p-norm for 1 < p ≤ ∞ can be arbi-
trarily larger.
In many scenarios, the demand is not fixed a priori but is dependent on
the prevailing network congestion. Models allowing these so-called elastic
demands have been extensively studied in the transportation science litera-
ture [?]. Recent work on elastic demands in Wardrop’s model focuses on the
efficiency of equilibria [?, ?] and optimal taxes [?].
1.6.7 Non-Selfish Agents
Recent trends in the Internet like open source software development establish
that selfishness may be not as rampant as we might expect. Instead, people
voluntarily contribute to public goods projects without direct personal benefit.
On the contrary, large uncoordinated systems often have to deal with spiteful
adversaries who single-mindedly strive to degrade the network wide perfor-
mance, Internet viruses being an infamous example. These examples exhibit
cooperative behavior through the evolution of social norms or altruism and
forms of spite as subjects aim to destruct systems. Thus, selfishness is not the
only challenge to optimize network performance.
In the Wardrop model altruistic and malicious behavior has been modeled
in several ways [?, ?, ?, ?]. Babaioff et al. [?] introduce a model in which a
certain fraction of agents act rationally and wish to minimize their individ-
ual latency. The remaining fraction of flow consists of malicious agents that
wish to maximize the total latency of the rational agents. The authors study
the existence of equilibria for these games and demonstrate a counterintu-
itive phenomenon which they coin “windfall of malice”: malicious agents can
improve the latency experienced by the selfish agents. Chen and Kempe [?] as-
sume that agents trade off the benefit of themselves against the benefit of the
others and prove that Wardrop equilibria are guaranteed to exist. They further
show that the price of anarchy for parallel link networks is merely a constant
in the presence of a non-negligible amount of altruists, thereby generalizing
the Stackelberg routing result of Roughgarden [?].
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The existence and computational complexity of equilibria in presence of
altruistic or malicious agents has also been considered for discrete congestion
games [?, ?].
1.6.8 Alternative Solution Concepts
Wardrop equilibria are the most prevalent solution concept in non-atomic self-
ish routing. But yet, some scenarios may require more general solution con-
cepts.
For instance, agents often face the problem of uncertain latency estimates.
The uncertainty may be caused by random effects, such as accidents, weather,
or varying traffic conditions in road traffic as well as noise or signal degra-
dation in the context of telecommunication networks [?]. Motivated by this
problem, Ordonez and Stier-Moses [?] introduced robust Wardrop equilibria that
account for the agents’ imperfect information. Robust Wardrop equilibria are
appealing as they always exist and can be computed in polynomial time.
In a related approach, Fisk [?] generalizes Wardrop’s traffic model in that
he formalizes a network optimization problem whose solution is a probabilistic
equilibrium that contains the original Wardrop equilibrium in a special case.
In congestion games several alternative solution concepts have been stud-
ied. Closely related to robust Wardrop equilibria, the concept of Bayesian equi-
libria has been applied to congestion games, in which agents possess only
imperfect information about the game [?]. Correlated equilibria rely on a trusted
authority telling the agents how to play to minimize their cost. Correlated
equilibria can be computed efficiently [?] and exhibit a small price of anar-
chy [?]. Strong equilibria [?] are strategy profiles in which no coalition of agents
may improve the latency of each of its members by deviating from the current
strategies. Their existence and their efficiency have also been studied [?]. Fi-
nally, sink equilibria constitute an attractive solution concept, since they exist
even in weighted congestion games. The price of sinking has been analyzed
by Goemans et al. [?].
1.7 Outline
In this thesis we study a variety of algorithmic problems in Wardrop’s model
that revolve around the price of anarchy and Braess’s paradox. In the first part
we study a general taxing problem and propose a novel approach to reduce
the influence of selfish routing. Secondly, we analyze the stability of Wardrop
equilibria with respect to network parameter changes. Lastly, we provide a
distributed approximation algorithm for Wardrop equilibria.
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As a prerequisite for our results, we need to specify how to encode an in-
stance (G, d). The network G can be represented using adjacency matrices or
adjacency lists, and the demand vector d consisting of k rational entries can be
encoded in a canonical way using binary representation. A natural represen-
tation of polynomial latency functions is the coefficient representation which
lists the coefficients of all monomials. All our positive results that require the
set of latency functions as input only hold for networks with linear or polyno-
mial latency functions. The impossibility results hold even for linear latency
functions. Hence, it is sufficient to have efficient encodings for these sets of
latency functions.
Reducing the price of anarchy via taxes The most popular approach
to reduce the inefficiency of Wardrop equilibria utilizes edge taxes. Marginal
cost taxes are known to reduce the price of anarchy to 1 [?]. Since imposing
taxes on every network edge may be impossible or costly, we consider the
more general problem of minimizing the network wide performance by setting
taxes for a given subset of edges only. While we prove that the problem is NP-
complete in general networks, we provide a polynomial time algorithm solving
this problem for single-commodity parallel link networks with linear latency
functions.
The results are presented in Chapter 2. In preliminary form these results
already appeared at the following conference:
• [?] Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, and Alexander Skopalik. Taxing Sub-
networks. In Proc. of the 4th Workshop Workshop on Internet and Network
Economics (WINE), pages 286-294, 2008.
Reducing the price of anarchy via auxiliary flow Taxing, Stackelberg
routing, and network design are the most prominent means to reduce the in-
efficiency of selfish flow in scenarios without central control. Nevertheless,
all of these approaches either require costly infrastructure or the possibility
of manipulating the network structure or the agents. We propose a novel ap-
proach to reduce the price of anarchy that circumvents all of these problematic
issues. We observe that routing an additional amount of flow, which we coin
auxiliary flow, can actually improve the equilibrium situation for the selfish
flow. We prove that the optimal auxiliary flow is NP-hard to approximate to
less than a factor of 4/3 and the minimal amount of an optimal auxiliary flow is
NP-hard to approximate within any subexponential factor. These results are
complemented by proving that the worst adversarial flow, i. e., flow that aims to
maximize the total latency, is also NP-hard to compute. In fact, in all cases we
obtain strong NP-hardness.
The results are presented in Chapter 3. In preliminary form these results
already appeared at the following conference:
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• [?] Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, and Alexander Skopalik. Doing Good
with Spam is Hard. In Proc. of the 2nd Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT), pages 263-274, 2009.
Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria Braess’s paradox displays intriguing
aspects of selfish behavior. In fact, it triggered the stability and sensitivity
analysis of Wardrop equilibria. While most existing literature concentrates on
qualitative questions [?,?,?], we upper and lower bound the change of the main
flow parameters at the induced equilibrium due to an ε-change. An ε-change is
defined as a demand increase by a factor of (1+ ε) or the removal of an edge
carrying only an ε-fraction of flow. For single-commodity networks, we show
how an ε-change may force every agent to change its path in order to recover
equilibrium. Our proof employs a family of networks generalizing Braess’
original graph. On the other hand, an ε-change in the demand increases the
path latency and the price of anarchy at most by a factor of (1 + ε)p for poly-
nomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients. In
contrast, the relative increase in the latency of an edge can be unbounded. For
multi-commodity networks neither the change in edge flows nor the increase
in the path latency can be bounded.
The results are presented in Chapter 4. In preliminary form these results
already appeared at the following conference:
• [?] Matthias Englert, Thomas Franke, and Lars Olbrich. Sensitivity of
Wardrop Equilibria. In Proc. of the 1st Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT), pages 158–169, 2008.
They also appeared as invited contribution to a special issue of Theory of Com-
puting Systems with selected papers from SAGT 2008:
• [?] Matthias Englert, Thomas Franke, and Lars Olbrich. Sensitivity of
Wardrop Equilibria. In Theory of Computing Systems, pages 263-274, 2009.
Distributed Approximation of Wardrop Equilibria The notion of War-
drop equilibrium requires complete knowledge about the latency dependence
of the edges as well as unbounded reasoning capabilities of the agents. Further,
most research on selfish routing focuses on the agents’ behavior at equilibrium
and exclude the question how the set of agents may attain such a stable state.
We study how approximate Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently
under rather weak assumptions on the agents’ information about the game.
Previous work [?] shows that the set of agents can approach Wardrop equilib-
ria quickly by following a simple round-based rerouting policy. Following the
so-called replication policy, in each round every agent concurrently samples an-
other agent uniformly at random. If the sampled agent’s path latency is lower
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than its current path latency, the agent switches to the other agent’s path with
a probability increasing with the offered improvement. The policy avoids the
problem of oscillation due to its carefully chosen switching probability. A
state, in which only a small fraction of the agents sustains latency significantly
above average is reached in a number of rounds that mainly depends on the
approximation parameters and the elasticity of the latency functions.
We consider a setting, in which the flow is controlled by a finite number of
agents only, each of which is responsible for the entire flow of one commodity.
Each agent has a set of admissible paths among which it may distribute its
flow. Each agent aims to balance its own flow such that the jointly computed
allocation will be at Wardrop equilibrium
Since the replication policy is designed for an infinite set of agents and
potentially exponentially many paths it does not directly yield a feasible dis-
tributed algorithm. However, applying a randomized sampling technique we
turn the replication policy into a distributed algorithm executable by finitely
many agents. The distributed algorithm achieves essentially the same con-
vergence rates as in the setting with an infinite number of agents. Thus, an
approximate Wardrop equilibrium is reached in a number of rounds that is
independent of the size and the topology of the network and can be computed
in expected polynomial time.
The results are presented in Chapter 5. In preliminary form these results
already appeared at the following conference:
• [?] Simon Fischer, Lars Olbrich, and Berthold Vöcking. Approximat-
ing Wardrop Equilibria with Finitely Many Agents In Proc. of the 21st
International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC), pages 238–252,
2007.
They also appeared as invited contribution to a special issue of Distributed
Computing with selected papers from DISC 2007:
• [?] Simon Fischer, Lars Olbrich, and Berthold Vöcking. Approximating
Wardrop Equilibria with Finitely Many Agents In Distributed Computing,
21(2) pages 129–139, 2008.
Chapter 2
Taxing Subnetworks
We have already seen in the introduction of this dissertation that the set of War-
drop equilibria embodies the set of stable states in Wardrop’s game theoretic
traffic model. Such equilibria are solutions of related convex programs and can
thus be found in polynomial time. In general a Wardrop equilibrium is not so-
cially optimal, i. e., it does not minimize the total latency. The inefficiency of
selfish flows has been extensively studied in previous work [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. In
fact, Roughgarden and Tardos [?] proved that even in parallel link networks
the price of anarchy may well be unbounded.
There are several approaches that have been proposed to address the in-
efficiency of equilibria, most notably via taxing network edges. Agents are
assumed to minimize the sum of their latencies and taxes. A fundamental
result is that using marginal cost pricing to set a tax on every edge results in
equilibrium flows that are optimal with respect to total latency [?]. Therein,
the tax an agent has to pay on an edge equals the additional delay its presence
causes for other agents on this edge.
Marginal cost pricing is widely accepted as a benchmark solution. How-
ever, the necessary underlying assumptions for marginal cost pricing will most
often be an obstacle in real world applications. In this regard, a serious draw-
back is that marginal cost pricing requires every edge of the network to be
taxable. In many networks there might be technical or legal restrictions that
prevent an operator from imposing a tax on all edges. Even assuming di-
rect access to the edges, the monitoring costs for many edges and the process
of collecting taxes may be considered prohibitive. On many edges it further
may generate only negligible benefits to social welfare. Therefore, we consider
the more realistic problem of computing taxes for a subset of taxable edges that
minimize the total latency of the resulting equilibrium. Nevertheless, we do
not impose further restrictions on the taxes itself besides non-negativity and
computability. This problem is certainly relevant in the context of road traffic,
as an increasing number of urban areas are installing electronic road charg-
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ing [?]. For example the optimal taxes for a toll-ring around a city center can
be the problem under consideration. This exemplifies that even if there are no
imposed restrictions, a central authority may have a self interest in restricting
the number or structure of taxed roads. In related work, Yang and Lam [?]
give heuristics for the same problem in a queuing network, while Verhoef [?]
presents analytically tractable solutions for small networks.
2.1 Our Results
Taxing subnetworks can be difficult and non-trivial. Consider the parallel link
network of two links and linear latency functions shown in Figure 2.1(a). If
one can tax only one edge, the total latency is generally not monotone in
the imposed tax. Using this insight, we carefully construct networks with
one taxable edge and several distinct optimal taxes. A combination of these
networks establishes NP-hardness of the problem for two commodities and
linear latency functions (Section 2.3). On the other hand, for parallel link
networks with linear latency functions, we derive a precise structural analysis
of optimally taxed equilibrium flows in Section 2.4. This allows to construct
a polynomial time algorithm to find optimal taxes. The main ingredients are
insights on the set of links carrying flow, dependencies between total latency
and demand, and linearity of latency functions. Unlike a large part of related
work, we do not need to resort on convex programming.
2.2 Preliminaries
We have already formally introduced Wardrop’s model [?] in this thesis. Con-
sidering the problem of taxing a subset of network edges, we slightly extend
the model and reformulate some classic results, which we will rely on through-
out this chapter.
We are given a directed graph G = (V, E) with vertex set V and edge set
E. Considering only parallel edges, we speak of parallel link networks and
denote the set of links by [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We allow a set of non-negative
taxes τ = {τe}e∈T to be imposed on a subset of edges T ⊂ E. We call edges in
T taxable and edges in N = E \ T non-taxable. For simplicity, we set τe = 0 for
e ∈ N. The disutility of an agent choosing a path P is defined as latency plus
tax, i. e., `P( f ) +∑e∈P τe. Finally, we call the quadruple (V, T, N, d) an instance.
Bearing the definition of an agents’ disutility in mind, at Wardrop equilib-
rium no fraction of the flow can improve its sustained latency plus taxes by
moving unilaterally to another path.
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Definition 5 (Wardrop equilibrium with taxes). A flow vector f is at Wardrop
equilibrium if for every commodity i ∈ [k] and paths P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0 it
holds that `P1( f ) +∑e∈P1 τe ≤ `P2( f ) +∑e∈P2 τe.
Remember that without taxes at Wardrop equilibrium all used paths in
commodity i have equal latency Li( f ) and the total latency can be expressed
as ∑i∈[k] Li( f ) · di ( [?, ?], 2). In the presence of taxes, however, all agents in
commodity i experience a unique disutility. A classical result on taxing selfish
flow, called marginal cost pricing, is that with taxes τe = xe · `′e(xe) for all e ∈ E
the resulting equilibrium flow minimizes the total latency. With `∗e (x) = (x ·
`e(x))′ = `e(x) + x · `′e(x) denoting the marginal cost of increasing flow on
edge e, Theorem 3 yields the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For an instance (V, E,∅, d) a flow f minimizes the total latency with
respect to (`e)e∈E if and only if it is at Wardrop equilibrium with respect to (`∗e )e∈E.
In the restricted case with only a subset of edges being taxable such a result
is obviously out of reach as Pigou’s example (cf. Figure 2.1(a)) exemplifies. If
only the constant latency edge is taxable, no improvement is possible. This
directly leads us to the following definition.
Definition 6 (Optimal taxes). Given an instance (V, T, N, d), a set of taxes {τe}e∈T
is called optimal if there is an equilibrium flow fτ with respect to `+ τ with
C( fτ) ≤ C( fτ′)
for all equilibrium flows fτ′ with respect to `+ τ′ for any {τ′e}e∈T.
2.3 NP-Hardness for Multi-Commodity Networks
In this section we study the computational complexity of Subnetwork-Tax.
In the decision problem Subnetwork-Tax we are given a multi-commodity
selfish routing instance (V, T, N, d) and a threshold value C. The problem is to
decide if there are taxes for the edges e ∈ T such that the induced equilibrium
incurs total latency of at most C. Subnetwork-Tax turns out to be NP-hard
even for the two-commodity case with linear latency functions. We start with
an observation that will allow us to discretize the problem.
Lemma 6. There is a family of instances (V, T, NA, dA)A∈N with parallel link net-
works allowing for two distinct optimal tax values.
Proof. Consider the network shown in Figure 2.1(b). Two nodes s and t are
connected via three links, with latency functions `1(x) = x + A and `2(x) =
`3(x) = x. Suppose we can only tax the third link.
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Figure 2.1: (a) A unit demand needs to be routed from s to t. Let A > 0. We can
tax the bold edge only. The total latency at equilibrium is minimized for
τ = A/2. In (b) routing a demand of A · (1+
√
3
2 ), the optimal tax for the
third link is τ = 0 or τ = A/4.
In the following we study the latency dependence on the imposed tax and
denote the total latency as C(τ).
Routing a demand of dA = A · (1 +
√
3
2 ) taxing has the following effect. For
tax 0 ≤ τ ≤ A · (1−
√
3
2 ), at equilibrium the total demand is split among links
two and three. Since both links have no offset the total latency increases with
increasing tax.
For every tax τ the flows on the bottom edges fulfill the equations
f2 = f3 + τ and
f2 + f3 = dA.
Thus,
f2 =
(
1
2
+
√
3
4
)
· A + 1
2
· τ and
f3 =
(
1
2
+
√
3
4
)
· A− 1
2
· τ.
The total latency of this equilibrium flow is
C1(τ) =
((
1
2
+
√
3
4
)
· A + 1
2
· τ
)2
+
((
1
2
+
√
3
4
)
· A− 1
2
· τ
)2
=
1
2
· τ2 +
(
7
8
+
√
3
2
)
· A2 .
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C1(τ) is minimized for τ = 0.
For A · (1−
√
3
2 ) < τ < A · (1 +
√
3
4 ) all links are used and the total latency is
not monotone as a function of the imposed tax. The corresponding flows and
the incurred latency can be calculated is a similar fashion as above. The link
flows satisfy
f1 + A = f2,
f2 = f3 + τ and
f1 + f2 + f3 = dA.
Thus,
f1 =
1
3
(
A ·
(√
3
2
− 1
)
+ τ
)
,
f2 =
1
3
(
A ·
(√
3
2
+ 2
)
+ τ
)
and
f3 =
1
3
(
A ·
(√
3
2
+ 2
)
− 2 · τ
)
.
induce a total latency of
C2(τ) =
2
3
· τ2 − 1
3
· A · τ +
(
11
12
+
√
3
2
)
· A2
that is minimized for a tax of A/4.
For τ ≥ A · (1+
√
3
4 ) the total latency at equilibrium is C2(A · (1+
√
3
4 )).
Hence, the total latency C is
C(τ) =

C1(τ) for 0 ≤ τ ≤ A · (1−
√
3
2 )
C2(τ) for A · (1−
√
3
2 ) < τ ≤ A · (1+
√
3
4 )
C2(A · (1+
√
3
4 )) for τ > A · (1+
√
3
4 ) .
Since C(0) = C(A/4) the instance admits two optimal taxes 0 and A/4.
Having discretized the problem we are now able to prove the main result
of this section.
Theorem 7. Subnetwork-Tax is NP-hard, even for instances with only two com-
modities and linear latency functions.
Proof. We reduce from the Partition problem: given k positive integers ai,
is there a subset S ⊆ [k] satisfying ∑i∈S ai = 12 ∑ki=1 ai? We will show that
deciding the Partition problem reduces to deciding if a given 2-commodity
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s1 v2 v3 vk t1
s2t2
x x x
x x x
D1 x + E1 D2 x + E2 D3 x + E3
x +∑i ai
x x x
x
Figure 2.2: The network of an instance (V{ai}, T{ai}, N{ai}, (d{ai})). The edges are la-
beled with the latency functions. Unlabeled edges have latency 0. Taxes
can be imposed on the set of bold edges only.
instance (V, T, N, (di)) with latency functions admits taxes inducing a Wardrop
equilibrium with a given total latency.
Given an instance of Partition specified by non-negative integers a1, a2, . . . , ak
we define an instance (V{ai}, T{ai}, N{ai}, (d{ai})) as depicted in Figure 2.2. Let
the set of taxable edges T consist of the bold edges.
Commodity one has a demand of A = ∏ki=1 ai to route between s1 = v1
and t1 = vk+1, the second commodity has to route a demand of ∑i ai between
s2 and t2. For i ∈ [k] define the following constants:
A−i =
k
∏
j 6=i
aj ,
Di =
2− 4A−i + A2−i
4A−i − 2 and
Ei = 2ai(Di + 1) =
AA−i
2A−i − 1 .
Note that all values can be encoded by a number of bits that is polynomial in
the size of the instance of Partition.
We show that {a1, . . . , ak} is a Yes instance if and only if there are taxes for
the instance (V{ai}, T{ai}, N{ai}, (d{ai})) inducing a Wardrop equilibrium with
total latency of at most C = k2 A
2 + 78(∑i ai)
2. Since both commodities do not
share any latency incurring edge, the constructed network allows for a sepa-
rated consideration of both commodities. The idea is that the minimal latency
is reached if and only if the tax between vi and vi+1 is 0 or ai and the sum of
all taxes is exactly ∑i ai/2.
First, consider the set of vertex disjoint paths between vi and vi+1 for some
i ∈ [k]. A demand of A needs to be routed between those two nodes. The
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situation resembles the situation described in the proof of Lemma 6. The total
latency is
Ci(τ) =

A2
2 +
τ2
2 for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 2Ei − A
(Di+1)τ2−Eiτ+A(Di A+Ei)
2Di+1
for 2Ei − A < τ < Di A+EiDi+1
Ci(
Di A+Ei
Di+1
) for τ ≥ Di A+EiDi+1 .
One can easily check that for A−i > 1 there are two non-empty intervals for tax
τ, in which the total latency as a function of the imposed tax τ is quadratic.
The constants Di and Ei are chosen in such a way that the total latency is
minimized for 0 and Ei2·Di+2 = ai. Thus, both taxes 0 and ai are optimal for the
set of parallel paths connecting vi with vi+1. The incurred total latency for the
optimal taxes is A2/2.
For the second commodity consider the sum g = ∑i τi of all taxes in the
network. At equilibrium a flow volume of ∑i ai − g2 is routed via the path
including the taxable edges, and a flow of volume g2 is routed via the lower
edge. The total latency of C¯(g) = (∑i ai− g2 )2 + g2 ( g2 +∑i ai) is then minimized
for g = ∑i ai/2.
First, assume {a1, . . . , ak} is a Yes instance. We reach optimality for both
commodities by choosing
τi =
{
ai for i ∈ S
0 for i /∈ S .
The total latency sums up to
C = ∑
i∈S
Ci(ai) + ∑
i∈[k]\S
Ci(0) + C¯
(
∑
i
ai/2
)
=
k
2
A2 +
7
8
(
∑
i
ai
)2
.
Now suppose {a1, . . . , ak} is a No instance. To obtain a total latency of k2 A2 for
commodity one, the tax on the taxable edge between vi and vi+1 needs to be 0
or ai for every i. For the second commodity a total latency of 78(∑i ai)
2 can be
obtained only if the sum of the taxes adds up to ∑i ai/2. Obviously, in a No
instance both conditions can not be achieved at the same time. Thus, the total
latency is above the threshold composed of the two optima and the reduction
is complete.
2.4 Parallel Links with Linear Latency Functions
The parallel link instances in the proof of Lemma 6 show that the total latency
is generally not monotone as a function of the imposed taxes. That holds even
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in the case of linear latency functions and one taxable link. Further, these
examples show that such instances do not necessarily admit a unique optimal
tax. These observations indicate that studying optimal taxes in parallel link
networks might be intriguing.
Our main goal in this section is to provide an algorithm for finding optimal
taxes in single-commodity parallel link networks (V, T, N, 1) in which every
link i ∈ [n] is equipped with a latency function `i(x) = aix + bi. This setting
has been of special interest in the related problem of computing a Stackelberg
leader strategy [?] described in the introduction. While this problem is already
NP-hard in this setting, it may be surprising that we will be able to formulate
a polynomial time algorithm for computing optimal taxes.
Suppose the links are numbered by N = {1, . . . , k} and T = {k + 1, . . . , n},
such that b1 ≤ . . . ≤ bk and bk+1 ≤ . . . ≤ bn. We use this labelling for conve-
nience, but note that the ordering conditions apply only within N and T. In
particular, we do not require bi ≤ bj for any i ∈ N and j ∈ T or any other
particular restriction or relation between the links of N and T.Without loss
of generality we assume at most one constant latency link in N ∪ T. Thus,
equilibrium flow and optimal flow are unique.
2.4.1 Candidate Supports Sets
Recall that a flow f is at Wardrop equilibrium if and only if there is a constant
L > 0, such that all used links i ∈ [n] have the same latency L = `i( fi),
whereas L ≤ `i′(0) = bi′ for unused links i′ ∈ [n]. Lemma 5 shows that a
flow f is socially optimal if and only if there is a constant C > 0 such that
C = `∗j ( f j) = 2aj f j + bj for all used links j ∈ [n], whereas C ≤ `∗j′(0) = bj′ for
unused links j′ ∈ [n].
Observation 8. Consider a routing instance with d = 0. Both equilibrium and
optimum satisfy the following condition: when increasing the demand from 0, the
links will be filled with flow in order of their offset b .
We will use this property for the problem of finding optimal taxes (τj)j∈T.
Regarding the agents disutility (latency plus tax) the set of taxes will induce an
equilibrium assigning flow to some link set S ⊂ N ∪ T. All used non-taxable
links have the same latency L. Since we allow for non-negative taxes only, all
used taxable links will not have higher latency. This property allows us to
parametrize the problem by the set of taxable and non-taxable links filled with
flow. These sets turn out to be candidate support sets defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Candidate support set). Every set of the form S = {1, . . . , l1} ∪
{k + 1, . . . , l2} with 1 ≤ l1 ≤ k and k + 1 ≤ l2 ≤ n is called a candidate support
set.
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Note that there are at most n2/4 candidate support sets for any instance.
Lemma 9. Let f denote a socially optimal flow for a parallel link network where every
edge is taxable. Then
`1( f1) ≤ `2( f2) ≤ . . . ≤ `n( fn) .
Proof. The set of used links is of the form {1, . . . , l} for some l ≤ n. Since
f is a minimal latency flow, all links j ∈ {1, . . . , l} have equal marginal cost,
and there is a constant C > 0 with 2aj f j + bj = C. Thus, `j( f j) = aj f j + bj =
C/2+ bj/2.
Let us first argue that the consideration of candidate support sets is indeed
sufficient to find optimal taxes. Imagine two separate commodities, routing
fixed demands dN and 1 − dN exclusively over N and T, resp. In such a
scenario, it would be optimal to set marginal cost taxes on T. According to
Observation 8 the set of used links form a candidate support set.
The difference to our setting is that demand can change between N and T,
and thus we also need to ensure that latency and taxes create an equilibrium
flow. In particular, latency plus tax of any used link in T must be equal to the
common latency L of all used links in N. Furthermore, the offset plus tax of
any unused link in T must be higher than L.
If the optimal flow of all links in T yields latencies only smaller than L,
then we can satisfy the latency constraint by setting appropriate non-negative
taxes. Otherwise, the latency restriction reduces the flow on some used links.
Naturally, this can happen to all links j ∈ T with bj ≤ L. However, if the
flow on a link is smaller than in the optimum due to the latency constraint,
the marginal cost on this link is also smaller. Therefore, it is still optimal to
fill the link with flow to the maximal possible extent, which we will prove
in Lemma 10. For all links not affected by the latency restriction, however, it
is optimal to equalize the marginal costs, and the allocation of flow follows
the ordering of offsets. In conclusion, it can be observed that the set of links
allocated with flow remains a candidate support set. Thus, it is sufficient to
restrict our attention to these sets.
2.4.2 Problem Parametrization
Fixing numbers nS and tS yields a candidate support set S = NS ∪ TS with
NS = {1, . . . , nS} and TS = {k+ 1, . . . , tS}. For S denote by dNS and 1− dNS the
demand routed over NS and TS, respectively. CNS(dNS) is the total latency for
an equilibrium flow ( fi)i∈NS of demand dNS . Denote by CTS(1− dNS) the total
latency for an optimal flow ( f j)j∈TS of demand 1− dNS additionally fulfilling
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the latency constraint `j( f j) ≤ L(dNS) for all links j ∈ TS, where L(dNS) denotes
the unique latency of all used links in NS for a demand of dNS . Finally, let
C(dNS) = CNS(dNS) + CTS(1− dNS)
denote the total latency of the entire flow.
We can further parametrize the problem of finding a set of optimal taxes
for a fixed set S by the demands routed over NS and TS. We formulate it in a
compact way:
minimize C(dNS)
s.t. ( fi)i∈NS equilibrium for demand dNS
s.t. ( f j)j∈TS optimal for demand (1− dNS)
s.t. s.t. `j( f j) ≤ L(dNS) ∀j ∈ TS
s.t. 0 ≤ dNS ≤ 1 .
Note that we require the equilibrium and the optimum to hold for N and T
(and not only for NS and TS). We will show that if this minimization problem
has a solution, the total latency C(dNS) is piecewise quadratic with at most n
breakpoints and the optimal demand distribution (d∗NS , 1− d∗NS) for NS and TS
for a candidate support set S is efficiently computable. Iterating this for all
possible sets S enables us to find optimal taxes.
Definition 8 (Full and relaxed links). We call a link j ∈ T full with respect to some
L > 0 if f j > 0 and its latency equals the constraint value, i. e., if `j( f j) = L or if
f j = 0 and `j(0) = bj ≥ L. We call a link relaxed if f j > 0 and `j( f j) < L.
When shifting demand from N to T, the common latency L of used links in
N decreases, while the demand on T increases. In the corresponding optimal
flow on T respecting the constraint value, however, a full link never becomes
relaxed.
More formally, consider an instance (V, T,∅, d) and let f denote the opti-
mal flow respecting `i( fi) ≤ L for all i. With Lemma 9 we can assume the full
links to form a set {p, . . . , n} for some p ≥ 1. Furthermore, assume there are
L′ ≤ L and d′ ≥ d such that there is a flow of demand d′ to T such that all used
links have latency at most L′. For all non-constant links, we define `−1i (L) to
be the flow fi such that ai fi + bi = L if bi ≤ L, and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 10. The optimal flow f ′ respecting `i( f ′i ) ≤ L′ for all i assigns `−1i (L′) flow
to all non-constant links i ∈ {p1, . . . , n} for some uniquely defined p1 ≤ p.
Proof. Restricting the latencies to at most L′ removes flow from links p, . . . , n
and distributes it among the remaining links. Therefore, more links might
become full with respect to L′. Let the newly affected links be p1, . . . , p − 1.
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Let f ′ denote the flow of volume d′ that assigns `−1j (L
′) of flow to every non-
constant link j ∈ {p1, . . . , n} and that is optimal on links 1, . . . , p1 − 1. Thus,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p1 − 1} and for all j ∈ {p1, . . . , n}
`∗j ( f
′
j ) ≤ `∗i ( f ′i ) . (2.1)
For contradiction, assume that respecting L′ there is an optimal flow f¯ with
f¯ j0 < f
′
j0 for some j0 ∈ {p1, . . . , n} . (2.2)
The latency `j0 is not constant since either j0 is full and, thus, f
′
j0
= 0 or j0
is relaxed and therefore it is not optimal to reduce the flow on j0. Since f¯ is
assumed to be optimal, for all links i ∈ {1, . . . , p1 − 1}
`∗j0( f¯ j0) ≥ `∗i ( f¯i) . (2.3)
Further, since {p1, . . . , n} loses flow there is a link i0 ∈ {1, . . . , p1 − 1} that
gains some flow, i. e.,
f¯i0 > f
′
i0
and therefore (even if `i0 is constant)
`∗i0( f¯i0) ≥ `∗i0( f ′i0) . (2.4)
Altogether,
`∗j0( f
′
j0) >
(2.2) `∗j0( f¯ j0) ≥(2.3) `∗i0( f¯i0) ≥(2.4) `∗i0( f ′i0) ≥(2.1) `∗j0( f ′j0) ,
which yields a contradiction.
2.4.3 A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Computing Optimal
Taxes
Considering an optimal flow for an increasing demand, the links become used
in order of their offsets. Note that Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 show that the
links become full with respect to some bound in reverse order. The fact that
we know the order in which the links become both used and full and the lin-
earity of the latency functions enable us to determine the lower and the upper
bound dminNS and d
max
NS
for dNS such that the following holds. The equilibrium
flow of demand dNS on N exactly uses the set of links NS and there is a flow
of demand 1− dNS on T respecting the bound L(dNS) exactly using the set of
links TS, whose total latency can not be improved by using links in T \ TS.
Given a candidate support set S we need to compute the optimal demand
distribution (dNS , 1 − dNS). If a distribution exists that fulfills the above re-
quirements we call S feasible. We call the corresponding demand intervals
[dminNS , d
max
NS
] feasible demand intervals.
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Lemma 11. The feasible demand intervals can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We will compute the feasible demand intervals by solving systems of
linear equations. As mentioned above, certain conditions on the flows on both
N and T must be met. Without loss of generality assume no constant latency
link.
Let us first consider N. We must ensure that at equilibrium there is some
flow on all links of NS and no flow on N \ NS. Thus, for all i ∈ NS
`i( fi) = ai fi + bi = L(dNS) ≤ bnS+1
must hold. Thus, it is not possible to obtain an equilibrium flow for N using
exactly the set NS for a demand exceeding
d+NS = ∑
i∈NS
fi = ∑
i∈NS
`−1i (bnS+1) .
Similarly we get a lower bound of
d−NS = ∑
i∈NS\{nS}
fi = ∑
i∈NS\{nS}
`−1i (bnS) .
For NS = N, we set d+NS = ∞. For NS = ∅, we set d
−
NS
= d+NS = 0.
Considering the set T, we must ensure that exactly the set TS = {k +
1, . . . , tS} is filled with flow, such that the latency of no link exceeds the bound
L and that shifting flow to links in T \ TS is not socially rewarding. Consider a
flow f of demand 1− d′NS such that
`j( f j) = L(d′NS) (2.5)
for all j ∈ TS. Note that both f and d′NS are unique.
If for the marginal costs
`∗j ( f j) ≤ btS+1
holds for all j ∈ TS, the upper bound for the demand routed over TS is d+TS =
1− d′NS . Here let btS+1 = ∞ for TS = T.
Otherwise set for all j with `∗j ( f j) > btS+1
f ′j = (`
∗
j )
−1(btS+1)
such that these links exhibit the same marginal cost values. Now, subtract
∑`∗j ( f j)>btS+1( f j− f
′
j ) from the current demand 1− d′NS and iterate the procedure
beginning at Equation 2.5. The desired upper bound is
d+TS = ∑
`∗j ( f j)≤btS+1
f j + ∑
`∗j ( f j)>btS+1
f˜ j ,
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where f˜ denotes the flow that has been obtained in the last iteration.
The lower bound for 1− dNS , denoted by d−TS , can be computed in an analogous
fashion.
Since we need to meet the conditions for the flows on both N and T at the
same time, we get demand bounds
dminNS = max{1− d+TS , d−NS} and
dmaxNS = min{1− d−TS , d+NS} .
Finally, the candidate support set S is feasible if and only if [dminNS , d
max
NS
] is
non-empty.
Lemma 12. The common latency L of all used non-taxable links at equilibrium is
linear as a function of dNS for dNS ∈ [dminNS , dmaxNS ].
Proof. Suppose f is at equilibrium for demand dNS . Then L(dNS) fulfills
L(dNS) = ai fi + bi for every i and
∑
NS
fi = dNS ,
which proves the claim.
Corollary 13. The total latency CNS(dNS) is quadratic for every feasible candidate
support set S and dNS ∈ [dminNS , dmaxNS ].
Proof. Suppose f is at equilibrium for demand dNS . Since L(dNS) is linear, the
total latency CNS(dNS) = L(dNS) · dNS is quadratic for dNS ∈ [dminNS , dmaxNS ].
Neglecting the constraints `j( f j) ≤ L(dNS), the total latency CTS of an opti-
mal flow on TS of demand 1− dNS is a quadratic function for similar reasons.
Respecting the constraints for increasing 1− dNS , we need to handle the full
links of decreasing latency. Due to the linearity of L, CTS turns out to be
quadratic with at most n breakpoints.
Lemma 14. The breakpoints, i. e., the demand values for which the number of full
links increases, can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 11 solving systems of linear equations is the
key. Respecting the constraint for increasing 1− dNS , an increasing number of
links in TS becomes affected by the bound L(dNS). This effect turns out to yield
a piecewise quadratic total latency with at most n breakpoints. For readability
let TS = {1, . . . , tS} for the remainder of the proof.
Computing an optimal flow respecting the bound L
We first efficiently compute an optimal flow x on TS of minimal demand, i. e.,
of demand 1 − dmaxNS , respecting `j(xj) ≤ L(dmaxNS ). We start with a socially
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optimal flow ( f j)j∈TS , which can be computed in polynomial time. If `j( f j) ≤
L(dmaxNS ), we are done and x = f . Otherwise, due to Lemma 9 there is a j0 ∈ TS
such that
`j( f j) ≤ L(dmaxNS ) < `j′( f j′)
for 1 ≤ j < j0 ≤ j′ ≤ tS and ∑TS f j = 1 − dmaxNS . Lemma 10 shows that it
is optimal to set xj = `−1j (L(d
max
NS
)) for the affected links j1, . . . , tS for some
j1 ≤ j0. In order to compute x, we first determine j1. We set f j′ = `−1j′ (L(dmaxNS ))
for j′ = j0, . . . , tS. Computing the optimal flow for the links 1, . . . , j0 − 1 for
a demand of (1− dmaxNS − ∑j0≤j′≤tS `−1j′ (L(dmaxNS )) and proceeding as described
above until `j( f j) ≤ L(dmaxNS ) for all links completes the computation of j1. Thus
we can compute the desired optimal flow x, in which the links j1, . . . , tS are full.
If j1 = 1, we are done. Otherwise, the imposed latency bound L(dNS) allows
for a higher demand for the set TS. Nevertheless, the total latency becomes
non-differentiable and we need to compute the corresponding breakpoints.
Determine the breakpoints
Now increasing the input demand 1− dNS , the latency bound of L(dNS) be-
comes more restrictive. Determining the first breakpoint, i. e., the demand
value dNS for which link j1 − 1 becomes full with respect to L(dNS), amounts
to solving
`j1−1( f j1−1) = L(dNS) , (2.6)
where ( f j) denotes an optimal flow with respect to the additional constraint
f j ≤ L(dNS) for all j. The equations
2a1 f1 + b1 = 2aj f j + bj for j = 2, . . . , j1 − 1 and
aj f j + bj = L(dNS) for j = j1 − 1, . . . , tS
uniquely define the link flows on TS. They can be written as
f j = αj(1− dNS) + β j
with αj and β j being rational functions in the coefficients of the latency func-
tions. Solving
∑
j∈TS
f j = ∑
j∈TS
(αj(1− dNS) + β j) = 1− dNS
for dNS yields the first breakpoint.
Lemma 15. The total latency functions CTS(1 − dNS) and C(dNS) are piecewise
quadratic for dNS ∈ [dminNS , dmaxNS ] with at most n breakpoints for every feasible can-
didate support set S. The breakpoints can be computed in polynomial time.
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Algorithm 1 OptTax (V, T, N, 1)
1: for every candidate support set S do
2: if S feasible then
3: compute the breakpoints dminNS = dNSk+1 , . . . , dNS1 , dNS0 = d
max
NS
4: d∗NS ← argmin0≤j≤k mindNS∈[dNS j ,dNS j+1 ] C(dNS)
5: end if
6: end for
7: γ(S) := C(d∗NS)
8: S∗ ← argminSγ(S)
9: compute optimal flow on TS∗ respecting L(d∗NS∗ ) with ∑TS∗ f
∗
j = 1− d∗NS∗
and set f ∗j := 0 for j ∈ T \ TS∗ .
10: set taxes τj ← L(d∗NS∗ )− `j( f ∗j ) for j ∈ T
For dNS ∈ [dNS1 , dmaxNS ] the bound L(dNS) restricts exactly links j1, . . . , tS and
the total latency
CTS(1− dNS) = ∑
j∈TS
`j( f j) f j = ∑
j∈TS
`j(αj(1− dNS) + β j)(αj(1− dNS) + β j)
is quadratic. Further increasing 1 − dNS , we get a piecewise quadratic total
latency function CTS in [d
min
NS
, dmaxNS ] with at most n breakpoints.
Theorem 16. Given an instance (V, T, N, 1) with parallel links and linear latency
functions Algorithm OptTax(V,T,N,1) computes a set of optimal taxes (τj)j∈T in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. Correctness We have already argued that restricting to candidate sup-
port sets is sufficient for finding optimal taxes.
Runtime For each of at most n2/4 candidate support sets the total latency
and all breakpoints can be computed in polynomial time. Obviously, the min-
imization steps can be carried out in polynomial time as well.

Chapter 3
Improving Equilibria with Auxiliary
Flow
Marginal cost pricing assumes a central authority that has direct access to ev-
ery network edge and that agrees to build and maintain the possibly very
costly infrastructure necessary to collect taxes. We have seen in the previous
chapter that the problem of computing optimal taxes for the more restricted
case where only a given subset of edges is taxable becomes intractable for
two-commodity networks. As another major drawback, marginal cost pricing
charges the agents higher taxes than necessary [?, ?]. Especially if the latency
functions on the edges have large derivatives, the marginal cost taxes can be
extremely large. While minimal optimal taxes for single-commodity networks
can be computed in polynomial time [?], they are NP-hard to determine in
multi-commodity networks [?]. Addressing a quite related question, several
researchers give worst-case bounds on the largest tax needed to induce an op-
timal flow [?, ?, ?]. Moreover, a look at classical taxing procedures from an
agents’ perspective reveals that, albeit taxes improve the latency of the net-
works, they do not improve the disutility of agents for a large set of networks,
e. g., for linear latency functions [?].
Alternative approaches to reduce the price of anarchy as Stackelberg routing
or network design directly manipulate the network or the agents both of which
are quite strong assumptions.
In this chapter, we study a means of reducing the inefficiency of selfish
flow applicable in scenarios with no central control that circumvents all of the
above mentioned problems. Our approach is motivated by the observation,
that routing some flow in addition to the given amount of selfish flow, may
in fact improve the performance of selfish flow. We introduce two sorts of
additional flow, which we we call auxiliary and adversarial flow.
The goal is to route the additional flow in such a way that the induced
equilibrium minimizes/maximizes the total latency of the selfish flow. The
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routed packets solely alter the latency of the used edges and have no intrinsic
value. Therefore we assume that the latency of the additional flow does not
contribute to the total latency. Note that we equip an instance either with aux-
iliary or with adversarial flow depending on our goal. The demand value of
the additional flow is given independently in addition to the given selfish flow
demand. We want to remark that our approach has similarities to the con-
cept of spam in the Internet. However, while in large uncoordinated networks
like the Internet spam does not accompany regular digital traffic, we route the
given extra amount of flow within the same commodity in order to influence
its performance.
3.1 Our Results
We first present networks where auxiliary flow eradicates the inefficiency of
the Wardrop equilibrium (Section 3.2). However, it turns out that both the
optimal auxiliary flow of given value and the minimal amount of an optimal aux-
iliary flow are NP-hard to compute (Subsection 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). Further, we
prove that for auxiliary flow there is no polynomial time approximation with
a factor of less than 43 . The minimal amount of the optimal auxiliary flow
needed to induce the best possible equilibrium cannot be approximated even
by any subexponential factor. These results are complemented by proving NP-
hardness for adversarial flow (Subsection 3.3.3).
3.2 Preliminaries and Initial Results
Again we rely on Wardrop’s model as described in the introduction, but we
will slightly extend the model and reformulate some of the classic results we
will rely on throughout this chapter.
We are given a directed graph G = (V, E), one commodity specified by
a source-sink pair (s, t) ∈ V × V, and a unit flow demand. Additionally to
the given selfish flow, we introduce two kinds of flows - auxiliary flow and
adversarial flow of demand δ > 0. The objective of the auxiliary/adversarial
flow is to minimize/maximize the total latency of the induced equilibrium of
the selfish flow. Given the routes of the additional flow and the selfish flow,
the total latency equals
C( f , δ) = ∑
e∈E
`e( fe + δe) fe .
If not specified further, we refer by flow to the selfish flow. Finally, we call the
tuple Γ = (G, (s, t), δ) an instance. Since in this chapter we will confine our-
selves to single-commodity networks the definition of a Wardrop equilibrium
now reads as follows.
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Figure 3.1: In absence of additional flow, a unit demand of the selfish flow uses only
the zig-zag-path at equilibrium. Routing auxiliary flow of demand 1/(2ε)
over the dashed path increases the latency on the top down edge. The
selfish flow then splits half-half among the bold paths and reaches the
social optimum.
Definition 9 (Wardrop equilibrium with additional flow). Given an instance Γ
and fixed routes for the additional flow δ, a flow vector f is at Wardrop equilibrium
if and only if for paths P1, P2 ∈ P with fP1 > 0 it holds that `P1( f + δ) ≤ `P2( f + δ).
Note that the extra commodity δ is not composed of stabilizing selfish
agents. Instead, the aim is to allocate this flow in a coordinated way to influ-
ence the total latency of the Wardrop equilibrium. Our optimization problem
is similar to Stackelberg routing [?]. In particular, it can be formulated as a
bilevel problem, where in a first phase the extra flow flow is allocated to the
routes. The additional flow naturally changes the latency on the used edges.
In a second phase the selfish flow stabilizes at Wardrop equilibrium depend-
ing on the allocation in the first phase. The resulting latency of the selfish flow
is to be optimized by the allocation of auxiliary/adversarial flow in the first
place.
Let us note two initial observations about auxiliary flow. Figure 3.1 yields
our first observation.
Observation 17. There are networks in which auxiliary flow eradicates the ineffi-
ciency of selfish routing.
One can easily modify the network in Figure 3.1, such that even an arbitrary
small amount of auxiliary flow does the job.
Observation 18. Adding auxiliary flow to selfish flow increases the path latency in
series-parallel graphs. Since the total latency at equilibrium equals the path latency L,
auxiliary flow of arbitrary value does not improve the total latency at equilibrium.
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3.3 Computational Complexity of Optimal Additional Flows
In this section, we discuss the computational complexity of problems related
to auxiliary and adversarial flow.
In the decision problem Optimal-Flow we are given a single-commodity
selfish routing instance, some auxiliary flow, and a threshold value C. The
problem is to decide if there is a routing of the auxiliary flow such that the
total latency at equilibrium is at most C.
In the decision problem Threshold-Flow we are given a single-commodity
selfish routing instance and auxiliary flow of amount δ. The problem is to
decide if there is a routing of the auxiliary flow such that the total latency of
the equilibrium is less or equal than the total latency at equilibrium induced
by any auxiliary flow δ′ > δ.
In the decision problem Worst-Flow a single-commodity selfish routing
instance is given, some adversarial flow, and a threshold value C. The problem
is to decide if there is a routing of the adversarial flow such that the total
latency at equilibrium is at least C.
We will show NP-hardness of these decision problems and give strong inap-
proximability results. Our results are based on extensions of Roughgarden’s
proof of NP-hardness for the Network-Design problem [?]. Motivated by
Braess’s paradox, the author formulates the problem as: Given an instance
(G, `) of the routing problem, which subnetwork H ⊂ G allows a Wardrop
equilibrium with minimal total latency? Roughgarden shows that for linear
latency functions Network-Design is NP-hard to approximate with a factor
less than 4/3. This negative result carries over to the case, in which taxes are
to minimize the total user disutility (latency plus tax) at equilibrium [?]. The
main result of this section is the strong inapproximability of Threshold-Flow.
This results sharply contrasts the work of Kaporis and Spirakis [?] on Stackel-
berg routing, which stated that the minimal amount of flow that a Stackelberg
leader needs to induce an optimal flow can be computed in polynomial time by
virtue of a surprisingly simple algorithm. They dubbed the minimal amount
of flow needed “Price of Optimum”.
3.3.1 Complexity of Optimal-Flow
Observation 17 shows that auxiliary flow can improve the total latency at War-
drop equilibrium. Here, we show that computing the optimal routing for a
given auxiliary flow is NP-hard.
Theorem 19. Optimal-Flow is NP-hard.
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Figure 3.2: This figure outlines the construction of G′. The dashed edges are the edges
of G and the dotted edges are the edges in P. The edges are labeled with
their latency functions.
Proof. We reduce from the problem 2 Directed Disjoint Path (2DDP) which
is known to be NP-hard [?]. An instance I = (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) is a directed
graph G with two distinguished pairs of vertices (s1, t1) and (s1, t2). An in-
stance I belongs to 2DDP, that is I ∈ 2DDP if and only if there exist two vertex
disjoint paths in G from s1 to t1 and from s2 to t2, respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume that there exist arbitrary paths from s1 to t1 and from s2
to t2, respectively.
Given an instance I = (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) with G = (V, E) and |E| = m,
we construct a single-commodity selfish routing game Γ = (G′, (s, t), 3m2) that
has the following properties: If and only if I ∈ 2DDP, optimal auxiliary flow
induces a Wardrop equilibrium with total latency of less than C = 32 m +
5
2 .
We construct G′ = (V′, E′) as follows: V′ = V ∪ {s, t} and
E′ = E ∪ {(s, s1), (s, s2), (t1, t)(t2, t)} ∪ P
with P = {(s, u), (v, t) | for all (u, v) ∈ E}. The latency function of each edge
e ∈ E is `e(x) = 1m x, for the edges e ∈ {(s, s1), (t2, t)} it is `e(x) = mx, for
the edges e ∈ {(s, s2), (t1, t)} it is `e(x) = m + 1, and for all edges e ∈ P it is
`e(x) = κ, where κ is a large constant only depending on m, e. g., κ = m3. Note
that in equilibrium no selfish flow is assigned to an edge e ∈ P, because the
latency of κ is much larger than the latency of any s-t-path not including an
edge e ∈ P.
If I ∈ 2DDP, then in G′ there exist two disjoint paths from s1 to t1 and from
s2 to t2, respectively. Let D ⊆ E be the set of edges of these two paths. An
auxiliary flow that assigns for all (u, v) ∈ E \ D flow of at least 3m to each of
the edges (s, u), (v, t) ∈ P, and (u, v) essentially forces the selfish flow to use
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the two disjoint paths only. The latency for flow demand d′ on such a path is
at least md′ + m + 1 and at most md′ + m · 1m + m + 1. Solving
md′ + m + 1+ α/m = m(1− d′) + m + 1+ β/m
with 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ m for d′ and 1− d′ shows that at equilibrium the maximal
flow on each of the two paths is upper bounded by m+12m . Therefore, the latency
of a path at a resulting Wardrop equilibrium is at most 32 m +
5
2 and the total
latency is at most C. In particular, there is an optimal routing of the auxiliary
flow such that the total latency at equilibrium is at most C.
If I /∈ 2DDP, we show that there no auxiliary flow that induces an equilib-
rium flow with total latency of less than 2m. We distinguish several cases by
the usage of the four edges incident to s and t. Since we have unit demand
and all used paths have the same length at equilibrium, it suffices to show that
there is a used path with latency of at least 2m.
1. If a flow uses a path starting with (s, s2) and ending with (t1, t), this path
has total latency of at least 2m + 2.
2. If a flow uses only paths starting with (s, s1) and ending with (t2, t), it
has total latency of at least 2m.
3. If a flow uses only paths starting with (s, s1) and ending with (t2, t) or
(t1, t), the latency from s1 to t must be the same on all paths. Therefore
every path has latency of at least 2m + 1.
4. If a flow uses only paths starting with (s, s1) or (s, s2) and ending with
(t2, t), the same argument holds.
5. If a flow uses at least one path starting with (s, s1) and ending with (t1, t)
and at least one path starting with (s, s2) and ending with (t2, t), there
exists a vertex v∗ that is contained in both paths. Due to the equilibrium
constraint, all path segments from s to v∗ and from v∗ to t must have the
same latency. Thus, every path has latency of at least 2m + 2.
Thus, the optimal auxiliary flow induces an equilibrium with total latency
less or equal C in Γ if and only if I ∈ 2DDP.
Note that the decision in the previous instances is whether the total latency
of the selfish flow can be reduced to at most C = 32 m +
5
2 . If this is impossible,
for every flow the total latency is at least 2m. Now suppose there is a polyno-
mial time approximation algorithm, which computes a
(
4
3 − ε
)
-approximation
for optimizing the total latency of selfish flow. Then, such an algorithm could
be used to decide sufficiently large instances of 2DDP using the previously
outlined construction. We therefore get the following corollary.
3.3 Computational Complexity of Optimal Additional Flows 61
s∗
s′1 Γ1
s′2 Γ2
s′k Γk
t′1
t′2
t′k
t∗
0
0
0
0
0
0
κ′
κ′
κ′ . . .
Figure 3.3: The network contains k = 3m2 · dε−1e copies of the network G′ of the proof
of Theorem 19. Between s∗ and t∗ there is a demand of k.
Corollary 20. For every ε > 0 it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal-Flow on
instances with linear latency functions to a factor of 43 − ε.
In addition, note that in the NP-hardness reduction the auxiliary flow is
much larger than the demand of selfish flow. However, we can show that the
result even holds if the auxiliary flow is only a (polynomially) small fraction
of the selfish demand.
Theorem 21. Optimal-Flow is NP-hard to approximate to a factor of 43 − ε for
every constant ε > 0 on instances with linear latency functions and auxiliary flow
δ ∈ O
(
d
poly(m)
)
.
Proof. Again, we reduce from 2DDP. Given an instance I and an ε > 0, we
construct a selfish routing game Γ as described in the proof of Theorem 19.
We use k = 3m2 · dε−1e copies Γ1, . . . , Γk of this game to create a new game
Γ′ as follows. We add a source vertex s∗ and a target vertex t∗. The vertex
s∗ is connected to each source vertex s′i of Γi (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k) by an edge
(s∗, si) with latency function `(s∗,si)(x) = 0. Likewise, there is an edge with
`(t′i ,t∗)
(x) = 0 from each vertex t′i to t
∗. Additionally, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1},
there is an edge from t′i to s
′
i+1 with `(t′i ,si+1)(x) = κ
′, where κ′ = k4. The
demand of the selfish flow is d = k, and the auxiliary flow is limited to 3m2
and C = d · (32 m + 52).
If I ∈ 2DDP, there is an auxiliary flow that yields an equilibrium flow with
total latency of at most d · (32 m + 52): We assign auxiliary flow of at most 3m2
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between the vertices s′i and t
′
i in each copy Γi as described in the proof of Theo-
rem 19. We assign the same amount of flow to the edges {(s∗, s′1), (t′1, s′2), . . . , (t′k−1, s′k), (t′k, t∗)}
to obtain a flow of at most 3m2 from s∗ to t∗. At the resulting Wardrop equi-
librium, there is a flow of 1 that is assigned to each copy Γi and the edges that
connect it to s∗ and t∗. Each of these flows has latency of at most 32 m+
5
2 . Thus,
the total latency sums up to at most d · (32 m + 52).
If I /∈ 2DDP, the total latency of the selfish flow is more than d · 2m. Note
that at equilibrium the selfish flow never chooses an edge that connects two
of the copies because it has latency of κ′, and there is always a s∗-t∗-path with
lower latency. Therefore, there is at least one copy Γi in which flow of at least
1 is routed from s′i to t
′
i. As shown in the proof of Theorem 19, the latency of
the s′i-t
′
i-paths is at least 2m. Since the flow is at Wardrop equilibrium, every
path between s′j and t
′
j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k has latency of at least 2m. Thus, the
total latency sums up to more than d · 2m.
Due to the known price of anarchy result [?], this hardness result can be
restated in view of algorithm design as: For linear latency functions the trivial
algorithm, i. e., routing no auxiliary flow, is the optimal algorithm.
3.3.2 Complexity of Threshold-Flow
The previous result showed that it is computationally infeasible to compute
the best possible auxiliary flow. In this section we show that even the minimal
amount of auxiliary flow that is needed to achieve the best possible Wardrop
equilibrium is hard to approximate.
Note that this result strongly contrasts the corresponding result of Kaporis
and Spirakis [?] for Stackelberg routing. In Stackelberg routing the minimal
fraction of flow needed by the Stackelberg leader to induce optimal latency
can be computed in polynomial time for arbitrary multi-commodity networks
using a surprisingly simple algorithm.
Theorem 22. Threshold-Flow is NP-hard.
Proof. Again, we reduce from 2 Directed Disjoint Path (2DDP). Given an
instance I = (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) with G = (V, E) and |E| = m, we con-
struct a single-commodity selfish routing game that has an optimal auxil-
iary flow of at most polynomial in m if and only if I ∈ 2DDP. Construct
Γ = (G′, (s, t), poly(m)) as described in the proof of Theorem 19 and modify
it as follows. Remove the edge (t2, t) and replace it with the following gad-
get. Add the vertices u and v and the edges (t2, u), (u, v), (u, t), (t2, v), (v, t).
Latency functions are `e(x) = (m2 − 12m+1 )x for the edges e ∈ {(t2, u), (v, t)}
and `e(x) = m2 +
1
2m+1 for the edges e ∈ {(u, t), (t2, v)} and `(u,v)(x) = 12m x. In
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Figure 3.4: This figure outlines the modified construction of G′ for the proof of Theo-
rem 22.
addition, we add edges (s, u), (s, v), (u, t) and (v, t) with latency κ to the set P
(cf. proof of Theorem 19).
Observe that for routing flow demand d′ ≤ m2m+1+23 m2m+1 from t2 to t, it is opti-
mal to leave all selfish flow on the zig-zag path, which generates path latency
md′ and also yields an equilibrium. Note that the optimum assignment of self-
ish flow that is achievable by (marginal cost) taxing might split the flow along
all three possible paths from t2 to t. However, the resulting latency of such a
flow is larger here, as the auxiliary flow, which can used to simulate taxes in
our gadget, is accounted in the latency of selfish flow. For flow larger than
m2m+1+2
3 m2m+1 , splitting the flow and assigning
d′
2 to the edges (t2, u), (t2, v), (u, t),
and (v, t) yields a better latency. This flow and its improved latency can be in-
duced using a sufficiently large auxiliary flow along edge (u, v). The auxiliary
flow needs only to be large enough to prevent the selfish flow from using the
edge (u, v). Observe, that for large demand values in our gadget splitting the
flow among (t2, u, t) and (t2, v, t) by blocking (u, v) yields also a better latency
than assigning an amount of flow to (u, v) that still allows some selfish flow to
use this edge as well.
If I ∈ 2DDP, then in G′ there exist two disjoint paths from s1 to t1 and
from s2 to t2, respectively. Again, let D ⊂ E be the set of edges of these
two paths. Then an auxiliary flow that assigns, for all (e, e′) ∈ E \ D, flow of
volume 3m to each of the edges (s, e), (e, e′) and (e′, t) forces the selfish flow
to use the two disjoint paths only. Thus, the flow becomes almost balanced
between the two disjoint paths. The best possible Wardrop equilibrium can be
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reached by sending additional auxiliary flow slightly unevenly over the edges
of both disjoint paths. Nevertheless, a polynomial amount of auxiliary flow is
sufficient to totally balance the selfish flow. To see this, assume some edge in
D receives a super-polynomial amount of auxiliary flow. The resulting latency
of this edge would then surpass the path latency of the other disjoint path.
Hence, an auxiliary flow of demand poly(m) is sufficient to obtain the best
possible Wardrop equilibrium.
Note that selfish flow of demand close to 1/2, i. e., less than m2
m+1+2
3 m2m+1 is
routed through the gadget from t2 to t. Therefore, it is not necessary to route
auxiliary flow over the edge (u, v).
If I /∈ 2DDP, then optimal auxiliary flow yields a Wardrop equilibrium in
which the whole selfish demand is routed from s via s1 and t2 to t. Especially, a
unit demand is being routed through the gadget between t2 and t. The optimal
auxiliary flow thus must block edge (u, v). Hence, it needs to route auxiliary
flow of demand δ over (u, v), such that
1
2m
δ+
(
m
2
− 1
2m+1
)
· 1
2
≥ m
2
+
1
2m+1
,
i. e., δ ∈ Ω(2m).
Note that the latency functions in our gadget use exponentially large coeffi-
cients. Nevertheless, the latency functions can be represented by a polynomial
number of bits in the input size, assuming that the numbers in our instance
are represented in binary coding.
The proof shows that deciding 2DDPcan be reduced to the decision whether
a polynomial auxiliary flow can be optimal in the previous instances or not.
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 23. For any constant ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Threshold-
Flow by a factor of 2m(1−ε).
3.3.3 Complexity of Worst-Flow
We have seen that the optimal auxiliary flow is NP-hard to compute. We now
turn to the computational complexity of computing the optimal adversarial
flow.
Theorem 24. Worst-Flow is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard problem Hamilton. A graph G ∈ Hamil-
ton if and only if G contains a Hamiltonian path. Given a directed graph
G = (V, E) with |V| = n and |E| = m and two vertices x, y ∈ V, we construct
a selfish routing game Γ = (G′, (s, t), δ) with the property that the latency
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Figure 3.5: This figure depicts the corresponding graph G′ for an instance G of the
problem Hamilton. The dashed edges correspond to vertices in G and
the dotted edges correspond to edges in G′.
maximizing adversarial flow induces total latency of at least C = 1n + δ if and
only if G ∈ Hamilton.
We construct G′ = (V′, E′) as follows: For every vertex v in G there is a pair
of vertices uv, wv in G′ and, additionally we have a source and a sink vertex
s and t. That is, V = {s, t} ∪ {uv, wv | ∀v ∈ V}. There are edges from s to
all vertices uv, from each vertex uv to wv and from all vertices wv to t. The
selfish flow will use only these edges. Additionally, we have edges (with high
latency) that connect a vertex wv with a vertex uv′ if there is an edge from v to
v′ in the graph G for v′ ∈ V − {x}. To summarize, E′ = S′ ∪U′ ∪W ′ with
S′ = {(uv, wv) | ∀v ∈ V},
U′ = {(s, uv), (wv, t) | ∀v ∈ V}, and
W ′ = {(wv, uv′) | ∀(v, v′) ∈ E and v′ ∈ V − {x}}.
For all edges e ∈ S′ we set `e(x) = x, for all edges e ∈ U′ we set `e(x) = 0,
and for all edges e ∈ W ′ we set `e(x) = κ for a constant κ > 0. Note that
the selfish flow never uses edges e ∈ W ′ and therefore assigns flow to the n
paths s, uv, wv, t for all v ∈ V. Without adversarial flow, the equilibrium flow
is equally distributed among these paths, and the total latency is n 1n2 =
1
n .
Assume G ∈ Hamilton and x = vi1 , . . . , vin = y is a Hamiltonian path
in the network G. Then it is possible to assign adversarial flow of amount δ
to all edges e ∈ S′ by choosing the path s, uvi1 , wvi1 , uvi2 , wvi2 , . . . , uvin , wvin ,, t.
Note, that the edges between the w and u vertices exist by construction. All
edges with non-constant latencies carry the maximal amount of adversarial
flow. This maximizes the total latency and yields n( 1n + δ) · 1n = 1n + δ.
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Consider a graph G /∈ Hamilton. Then there is no path in G′ from s to
t that visits all vertices e ∈ U′. Therefore, the adversarial flow δ can not be
sent via all edges e ∈ S′, and there is at least one edge e ∈ S′ with adversarial
flow less than δ. Thus, the equilibrium flow will balance accordingly among
all paths containing an edge e ∈ S′. The resulting path latency and thus the
total latency at equilibrium is strictly less than 1n + δ.
Chapter 4
Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria
In the preceding chapters we have tackled the problem of reducing the price of
anarchy for routing instances, where fixed amounts of flow need to be routed
among source-sink pairs through the network. In uncoordinated networks,
however, neither the demands remain constant nor does the network topology
remain unchanged. In this regard, we study how equilibrium flows react to
slight modification of the network environment.
To analyze this issue, we suppose we are given an equilibrium flow for
unit demand and increase the demand by ε or remove an edge carrying only
an ε-fraction of flow. How does the equilibrium responds to such an ε-change
in terms of change in flow and latency?
The Braess network depicted in Figure 4.1 exhibits that, in general, neither
path flows nor edge flows at equilibrium are monotone functions of the de-
mand. This observation has already been made by Braess [?] and suggests that
studying the effects of environmental changes might be intriguing. As one im-
mediate implication Wardrop equilibria are not computable or approximable
s t
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1
x
0
(a) Latency functions ...
s t
1
ε
ε
1
1− ε
(b) ... and flow.
Figure 4.1: (a) The links are labeled with the latency functions. At equilibrium the
entire demand routes over the zig-zag-path. (b) The links are now labeled
with the unique equilibrium flow. Increasing the demand by 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1,
the zig-zag-path loses an ε-fraction.
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using the following naive algorithm (for simplicity we will restrict to single-
commodity instances). Given some N > 0, divide the total demand in chunks
of size d/N. Compute a shortest path and place a flow of d/N on this path.
Proceed by allocating the second flow fraction to a shortest path integrating
the already located flow. Iterating this N times. As Braess’s network shows,
the so-established flow unfortunately can be far from the unique equilibrium
flow.
4.1 Our Results
Our findings for single-commodity networks are as follows. Allowing non-
decreasing, continuous latency functions, we show in Section 4.2 that for every
ε > 0,
• there are networks, in which after an ε-change every agent is forced to
change its path in order to recover equilibrium and
• the flow increase or decrease on every edge, however, is at most ε for
every network.
Thus, in contrast to our remarkable finding of global instability of equilibrium
flow, we can prove that edge flows are locally stable. Examining the latency
at equilibrium, we concentrate on polynomial latency functions of degree at
most p with nonnegative coefficients. We show in Section 4.3 that, due to an
ε-change in the demand,
• the path latency at equilibrium increases at most by a factor of (1 + ε)p
(even though the relative increase in the latency of an edge can be un-
bounded).
This result yields the same bound on the increase in the Price of Anarchy, as
well. All presented bounds are best possible.
For the multi-commodity case, we present examples for every ε > 0 show-
ing that neither the change in edge flows nor the increase in the path latency
can be bounded. This holds already for networks equipped with linear latency
functions (Section 4.4).
Most related to our work is a series of papers conducting qualitative analy-
ses of the equilibrium under demand changes. While in multi-commodity net-
works the increase of one flow demand might decrease other path latencies at
equilibrium [?], the vector of path flows and the vector of the path latencies are
continuous functions of the input demand [?]. For single-commodity networks
the path latency at equilibrium is a monotone function of the input demand.
These positive results hold even for non-separable latency functions [?].
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Figure 4.2: (a) Having unit demand, the solid paths in Bk=3 carry 1/3 of flow each,
and the dashed edges carry zero flow. (b) After increasing the demand
by (1 + ε) = (1 + 1/3), the solid paths lose all their flow, and the paths
containing the dashed edges gain flow of (1+ ε)/(k + 1) = 1/3 each.
4.2 Sensitivity of Equilibrium Flows
For most of the section we concentrate on the single-commodity case. First, we
present a network with linear latency functions for any given ε > 0, in which
every agent needs to change its current path to recover equilibrium. Then we
prove that due to ε-changes the flow on every edge does not change by more
than ε.
4.2.1 Instability of Equilibria: Every Agent Needs to Move
In [?] Roughgarden uses the generalized Braess graphs to show, that the path
latency at equilibrium can arbitrarily decrease by removing several edges from
a network. Our definition of Bk differs from the definition in [?] in the non-
constant latency functions.
Definition 10 (Generalized Braess graph). For every k ∈ N, let Bk = (Vk, Ek) be
the graph with Vk = {s, v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk, t} and Ek = {(s, vi), (vi, wi), (wi, t) :
1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(vi, wi−1) : 2 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(s, wk)} ∪ {(v1, t)}. Let Bk be equipped
with the following latency functions.
• `kvi,wi(x) = 0 and `ks,vk−i+1(x) = `kwi,t(x) = i · k · x for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
• `kvi,wi−1(x) = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k and
• `ks,wk(x) = `kv1,t(x) = 1.
Let Bk be called the kth Braess graph.
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Let ε > 0 and consider the instance (Bd1/εe, 1).
Let (P1, . . . , P2k+1)T = (Ps,wk,t, Ps,vk,wk,t, Ps,vk,wk−1,t, Ps,vk−1,wk−1,t, . . . , Ps,v1,t)
T denote
the corresponding path vector. The equilibrium flow is described by the vector
( fPj) of path flows
fPj =
{
0 for j = 1, 3, . . . , 2k + 1
1/k for j = 2, 4, . . . , 2k
summing up to ∑P fP = ∑
2k+1
j=1 fPj = 1.
All paths have path length `P( f ) = k + 1, and since any unilateral devia-
tion strictly increases the sustained latency, the edge flows at equilibrium are
unique (Figure 4.2).
By increasing the demand by (1 + ε) the equilibrium flow vector becomes
( f ′Pj) with
f ′Pj =
{
(1+ ε)/(k + 1) for j = 1, 3, . . . , 2k + 1
0 for j = 2, 4, . . . , 2k
which sums up to ∑P f ′P = ∑
2k+1
j=1 f
′
Pj
= 1 + ε. The path latency can easily be
computed to be 1+ k
2(1+ε)
k+1 .
Note that the path flow decomposition at equilibrium does not need to be
unique. Nevertheless, we have uniqueness in Bk.
Definition 11 (ε-edge). An edge e ∈ E carrying flow of at most ε is called ε-edge.
Theorem 25. Let ε > 0 and consider (Bd 1ε e, 1). Then increasing the flow by ε causes
the entire demand to be redistributed to recover a Wardrop equilibrium, i. e., every
agent is forced to change its path. Adding another edge to the network, one can achieve
the same result for the removal of an ε-edge.
Proof. For the path flow vector ( fPj) and ( f
′
Pj
) it holds that fPj = 0 ⇔ f ′Pj > 0.
For the second assertion, simply simulate a demand increase in Bd 1ε e by directly
connecting source s with sink t and choose the latency function such that (s, t)
carries an ε-fraction of flow. Then remove this edge.
Let us remark that Theorem 25 can easily be transferred to optimal flows,
i. e., flows minimizing the total cost. This is since for semi-convex latency
functions optimal flows are Wardrop equilibria with respect to the marginal
cost functions. Thus, it is sufficient to change the linear latency functions in
Bd 1ε e.
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4.2.2 Edge Flows are Locally Stable
Let f , f ′ ∈ F be feasible flows for demands d ≤ d′ and let ∆( f , f ′) denote the
difference of f ′ and f ,
∆e( f , f ′) = f ′e − fe , ∀e ∈ E .
An edge e is positive (with respect to f ′ and f ) if f ′e − fe > 0, and it is negative
if f ′e − fe < 0. A path is positive (or negative) if all its edges are positive
(or negative). Let us remark that considering ∆( f , f ′) negative edges carry a
positive amount of flow equal to fe − f ′e and have their directions reversed.
Observe that the flow conservation property holds for the difference of two
network flows.
Definition 12 (Alternating flow cycle). A cycle consisting of flow carrying edges is
called an alternating flow cycle.
Lemma 26. Let f denote an equilibrium flow for an instance (G, 1) with non-decreasing,
continuous latency functions. Then there is an equilibrium flow f ′ for (G, 1+ ε), such
that ∆( f , f ′) does not contain an alternating flow cycle.
Proof. Let f ′ denote an equilibrium flow for (G, 1 + ε). Assume there is an
alternating flow cycle C in ∆( f , f ′). Since we can assume both equilibrium
flows to be cycle free, we can assume that the alternating flow cycle C contains
positive and negative edges. C can thus be divided into positive and negative
path segments, C = p1n1p2 . . . nk, where pi denotes a sequence of positive
edges and ni denotes a sequence of negative edges. Let ui be the first node of
pi and denote the last node of ni by vi. Thus, there are two paths from u1 to
vk in C. For u, v ∈ V, let `(u, v) denote the minimum path latency from u to v
under f . For u = s simply write `(v). For f ′ write `′(u, v) and `′(v).
There are two facts we will make consistently use of. Since at equilibrium
the flow routes only on shortest paths, we have
`(v) ≤ `(u) + `(u, v) for any u, v ∈ V , and (4.1)
`(v) = `(u) + `(u, v) (4.2)
if there is a flow carrying path between s and v containing u. We show that
assuming f and f ′ being at equilibrium yields `′(u1, vk) = `(u1, vk). On the
one hand, since nk connects u1 with vk and there is more flow on every edge
of nk under f than under f ′, we have
`′(u1, vk) ≤ ∑
e∈nk
`e( f ′e) ≤ ∑
e∈nk
`e( fe) = `(u1, vk) .
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For the reverse direction we show `′(vk) ≥ `′(u1)+ `(u1, vk), since then `(u1, vk) ≤
`′(vk)− `′(u1) ≤ `′(u1, vk). In the following, we repeatedly make use of Equa-
tions (4.1) and (4.2).
`′(vk) = `′(uk) + `′(uk, vk) ≥ `′(vk−1)− `′(uk, vk−1) + `′(uk, vk)
= `′(uk−1) + `′(uk−1, vk−1)− `′(uk, vk−1) + `′(uk, vk)
≥ `′(u1) +
k
∑
i=1
`′(ui, vi)−
k
∑
i=2
`′(ui, vi−1)
≥ `′(u1) +
k
∑
i=1
`(ui, vi)−
k
∑
i=2
`(ui, vi−1)
≥ `′(u1) +
k
∑
i=1
(`(vi)− `(ui))−
k
∑
i=2
(`(vi−1)− `(ui))
= `′(u1)− `(u1) + `(vk) = `′(u1) + `(u1, vk) .
The third inequality is valid since f and f ′ route only on shortest paths. Ex-
plicitly, `′(ui, vi) = ∑e∈pi `e( f
′
e) ≥ ∑e∈pi `e( fe) ≥ `(ui, vi) for each i ∈ [k] and
`′(ui, vi−1) ≤ ∑e∈ni `e( f ′e) ≤ ∑e∈ni `e( fe) = `(ui, vi−1) for each i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
Thus, `′(u1, vk) = `(u1, vk).
We deduce that the latency on every edge e ∈ nk does not change due
to the flow change. Since the same analysis can be conducted for any path
segment pi and ni, the latency of both paths on C connecting two arbitrary
nodes remains unchanged. Therefore, by removing the bottleneck edge flow
in C no edge latency is affected and the alternating flow cycle is eliminated.
We may remove the set of alternating flow cycles in any order. Adding f to the
altered difference, one gets the desired equilibrium flow for demand 1+ ε.
Thus, ∆( f , f ′) can be assumed a network flow of volume ε when edges are
allowed to be traversed in both directions. We can now state the following
theorem.
Theorem 27. Let f denote an equilibrium flow for an instance (G, 1) with non-
decreasing, continuous latency functions `.
• Then there is an equilibrium flow f ′ for (G, 1 + ε), such that for all e ∈ E it
holds that |∆e( f , f ′)| ≤ ε.
• Consider an ε-edge (u, v) in G. There is an equilibrium flow f ′ for (G′ =
(V, E− {(u, v)}), 1) such that |∆e( f , f ′)| ≤ ε for all e ∈ E.
Proof. Since the difference of f and f ′ can be assumed alternating flow cycle
free, it constitutes a network flow of volume ε. To show the second asser-
tion, let a single ε-edge (u, v) be removed. With the same argumentation as in
4.3 Stability of the Path Latency 73
Lemma 26, we can exclude alternating flow cycles in ∆( f , f ′) that do not in-
clude (u, v). Due to the flow conservation property for every node u 6= w 6= v,
∆( f , f ′) is a network flow from u to v of volume ε.
Note that since every edge gains or loses at most an ε amount of flow
(Theorem 27), with respect to the number of paths Bd 1ε e is a minimal example
exhibiting global instability.
4.3 Stability of the Path Latency
The latency increase at equilibrium due to a demand increase clearly depends
on the latency functions. Considering polynomials with nonnegative coeffi-
cients, the maximal degree is the critical parameter. Note that the results in
this section do not trivially result from Theorem 27, since the relative flow
increase on an edge might be unbounded.
Theorem 28. Let f and f ′ be equilibrium flows for instances (G, 1) and (G, 1 + ε)
with polynomial latency functions ` of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients.
Let L and L′ denote the corresponding path latencies. Then L′ ≤ (1+ ε)p · L.
Proof. Due to a scaling argument it is sufficient to consider monic monomials
as latency functions. For equilibrium flows f and f ′ we have
L = ∑
P∈P
fP`P( f ) =∑
e
fe`e( fe) and (1+ ε) · L′ =∑
e
f ′e`e( f ′e) ,
and we want to show that ∑e f ′
pe+1
e ≤ (1 + ε)p+1∑e f pe+1e , where `e(x) = xpe .
Since equilibrium flows f and f ′ minimize the potential function
Φ(x) =∑
e
∫ xe
0
`e(u) du
over feasible flows x of volume 1 and (1+ ε), respectively, it holds that
Φ( f ) ≤ Φ
(
f ′
1+ ε
)
and Φ( f ′) ≤ Φ((1+ ε) · f )
More explicitly,
(1+ ε)p+1 ·Φ( f ) = (1+ ε)p+1 ·∑
e
1
pe + 1
f pe+1e ≤∑
e
(1+ ε)p−pe
pe + 1
f ′pe+1e , (A)
and similarly,
Φ( f ′) =∑
e
1
pe + 1
f ′pe+1e ≤∑
e
(1+ ε)pe+1
pe + 1
f pe+1e . (B)
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For contradiction, assume
(1+ ε)p+1∑
e
f pe+1e <∑
e
f ′pe+1e . (C)
Calculating p · (A) + ((p + 1)(1+ ε)p − 1) · (B) + ((1+ ε)p − 1) · (C) yields
p
∑
k=0
ck ∑
pe=k
f pe+1e <
p
∑
k=0
c′k ∑
pe=k
f ′pe+1e , (4.3)
with
ck = p · (1+ ε)
p+1
k + 1
− ((p + 1)(1+ ε)p − 1) · (1+ ε)
k+1
k + 1
+ ((1+ ε)p − 1) · (1+ ε)p+1 .
and
c′k = p ·
(1+ ε)p−k
k + 1
− ((p + 1)(1+ ε)p − 1) · 1
k + 1
+ ((1+ ε)p − 1) .
In the following we show that c′k ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ p. Similar arguments can be
used to show ck ≥ 0. Hence, we have a contradiction to Equation (4.3).
For any 0 ≤ k ≤ p and ε = 0, we have c′k = 0. We show that c′k is
monotonically decreasing in ε (for ε ≥ 0). The derivative of c′k with respect to
(1+ ε) is
∂c′k
∂(1+ ε)
= p · (p− k) · (1+ ε)
p−k−1
k + 1
− p · (p + 1) (1+ ε)
p−1
k + 1
+ p · (1+ ε)p−1 .
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
1
(1+ ε)p−k−1
· ∂c
′
k
∂(1+ ε)
≤ 0 .
The inequality is equivalent to (p− k) ≤ (p− k) · (1+ ε)k which concludes the
proof of the theorem.
The bound is tight as shown by the network consisting of two nodes con-
nected by an edge equipped with the latency function `(x) = xp. Allowing
negative coefficients the relative increase obviously can be unbounded.
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Figure 4.3: Unlabeled edges cause no latency. Assume there are 2 · d 1ε e − 1 many
edges on the unique path connecting s2 with t2. For d1 = d2 = 1, the flow
demand of commodity 1 is uniformly spread over all d1/εe paths using
one edge on the path connecting s2 and t2. After increasing d2 by ε, we
have f(s1,t1) = 1.
4.3.1 Increase of the Price of Anarchy
The price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of performance due to selfish
behavior. Recall that the price of anarchy for an instance (G, d) is defined as
ρ(G, d) = C( f ∗)C( f ) , where f and f ∗ denote an optimal flow and an equilibrium
flow, respectively. In [?] the price of anarchy is shown to be asymptotically
Θ( pln p ) for polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative
coefficients.
Corollary 29. Let ρ and ρ′ denote the price of anarchy for instances (G, 1) and (G, 1+
ε) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients.
Then ρ′ ≤ (1+ ε)p · ρ.
Proof. Let L¯d denote the average path latency for an optimal flow in (G, d). Let
C, C∗, C′ and C′∗ denote the costs of an optimal flow and an equilibrium flow
for demands 1 and 1+ ε, respectively. Then ρ = C∗/C and ρ′ = C′∗/C′. Since
C = 1 · L¯1 and C′ = (1+ ε) · L¯1+ε, we have
(1+ ε) · C = (1+ ε) · L¯1 ≤ (1+ ε) · L¯1+ε = C′ ,
since the average latency is clearly monotone in the demand. Thus, the in-
crease of the price of anarchy can be bounded by
ρ′
ρ
=
C′∗/C′
C∗/C
=
L′ · (1+ ε) · C
L · C′ ≤
L · (1+ ε)p · (1+ ε) · C
L · C · (1+ ε) = (1+ ε)
p ,
where the inequality is due to Theorem 28.
This upper bound is tight in the following sense: There is a network family
(G, d) with latency function `(p), such that limp
ρ′/ρ
(1+ε)p = 1 for every ε > 0.
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This holds for mildly modified instances of Pigou’s example [?]. Replace the
latency functions 1 and x in Pigou’s example with (1+ ε)p and xp. We calculate
C∗ = 1, C′∗ = (1+ ε)p+1,
C =
(1+ ε)p+1
(p + 1)(p+1)/p
+ (1− 1+ ε
(p + 1)1/p
)(1+ ε)p ,
and
C′ = (1+ ε)
p+1
(p + 1)(p+1)/p
+ (1+ ε− 1+ ε
(p + 1)1/p
)(1+ ε)p .
Thus, we have
ρ′
ρ
= (1+ ε)p ·
(
1− (p + 1)
1/pε p
(p + 1)(p+2)/p − p(p + 1)1/p
)
,
and it holds that limp
ρ′/ρ
(1+ε)p = 1 for every fixed ε > 0.
4.4 Instability in Multi-Commodity Networks
There are no analogous results to Theorem 27 and 28 for the multi-commodity
case. Figure 4.3 shows a network with two commodities, with both demands
being 1, in which after increasing the demand of the second commodity or both
demands by ε the entire demand of the first commodity needs to be shifted to a
single edge to recover an equilibrium state. If a single ε-edge is being removed,
other edges might also lose an arbitrary fraction of the commodity’s demand.
Also, the path latency of one commodity can increase arbitrarily in multi-
commodity networks. Consider a network of three nodes s = s1 = s2, t1
and t2, three edges (s, t1), (s, t2), and (t1, t2), latency functions `s,t1(x) = x,
`s,t2(x) = k x, and `t1,t2(x) = k
2 − 1, and demands d1 = 1 and d2 = k. If
both demands are increased by a factor of (1+ ε), the path latency of the first
commodity multiplicatively increases by 1+ k · ε. (Insisting on unit demands,
one can split commodity 2 into k small commodities.) Simple examples exhibit
an even higher increase.
Chapter 5
Distributed Approximation
Given complete information about the game, Wardrop equilibria can be for-
mulated as convex programs (under some mild assumptions on the latency
functions) and can thus be solved by centralized algorithms in polynomial
time. In particular, the convex programming formulation requires the exact
latency functions and the demand of every commodity. In this chapter, we re-
frain from the complete information premise and study distributed algorithms
to compute Wardrop equilibria.
The common game-theoretic interpretation of the Wardrop model, which
we heavily made use of in the previous chapters, assumes an infinite number
of agents, each of which carries an infinitesimal amount of flow. In [?] it
was shown that such a set of agents approaches Wardrop equilibria quickly by
following a simple round-based load-adaptive rerouting policy (for a thorough
treatment cf. the dissertation of Fischer [?]). This policy, called the replication
policy, is executed by all agents in parallel and proceeds in the following way.
Each agent samples another agent at random and, if this improves the latency,
migrates to this agent’s path with a probability proportional to the latency
gain.
For scenarios in which detailed information about the environment are rare
and the consequences of a strategy change may be hard to assess, the replica-
tion policy describes natural behavior: Imitation of successful agents. In this
setting, a natural goal is to reach approximate equilibria in the following bi-
criterial sense. We say that a flow is at δ-e-equilibrium if at most an e-fraction
of the flow utilizes paths whose latency exceeds the average latency of their
commodity by more than a δ-fraction of the overall average latency. Remark-
ably, the number of rounds to reach an approximate equilibrium in this sense
is independent of the size and the topology of the underlying network and
chiefly depends on the approximation parameters and the elasticity of the la-
tency functions.
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We consider a different setting, in which the flow is controlled by a finite
number of agents only, each of which is responsible for the entire flow of one
commodity. Each agent has a set of admissible paths among which it may
distribute its flow. To be able to represent exponentially large collections of
paths we assume that these are represented by a DAG connecting the source
and the sink of the agent. Each agent aims at balancing its own flow such that
the jointly computed allocation will be at Wardrop equilibrium.
In each round each agent can observe the edge flows of its own commodity
and the latency values of the paths it uses, but it does not know the latency
functions themselves or the other agents’ flow demands. Let us remark that
agents do not aim at minimizing the overall latency of their flow as in the
splittable demand model [?], but seek to minimize the maximum latency of
their commodity.
5.1 Our results
Unfortunately, the replication policy does not yield a feasible distributed algo-
rithm in this setting directly. Simulating an infinite number of agents each of
which chooses one out of the given collection of paths would require maintain-
ing one variable for each path and computing a quadratic number of migration
rates between pairs of paths. As the number of paths may be exponential in
the size of the network this approach is rendered computationally infeasible.
We present two approaches to circumvent this problem. Our first approach
exploits the fact that, for a simplified variant of the replication policy, the
updates of the edge flows can be expressed in a way that merely uses the
edge flow variables themselves (rather than the path flow variables). Thus, the
updates can be computed in polynomial time. The convergence time of this
variant is only pseudopolynomial in the latency functions since it depends on
the maximum slope of the latency functions.
Since the original replication policy cannot be expressed in this compact
way, we consider a second approach to achieve convergence in a polynomial
number of communication rounds. Consider a collection of paths for one of
the commodities. In a first step, our algorithm samples a polynomial num-
ber of paths with probability proportional to their flow. We thus obtain a
randomized path decomposition. We consider paths in this decomposition with
above-average latency. From such paths, a fraction of the flow is removed and
reallocated proportionally among all admissible paths. If this is done carefully,
oscillations can be avoided, and a potential function argument ensures conver-
gence towards Wardrop equilibria. Thus, we achieve essentially the same con-
vergence rates as in the setting with an infinite number of agents and keep the
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computation time of one communication round polynomial. Altogether, we
can compute approximate Wardrop equilibria in expected polynomial time.
Let us comment on the inherent weakness of the underlying replication
policy. Because agents only imitate each other, they are not able to explore
currently unused, possibly very cheap paths. Hence, convergence to the set of
Wardrop equilibria can not be guaranteed. To this end, we assume a positive
amount of flow on each network edge, which ensures not only that we reach
an δ-e-equilibrium, but in fact convergence to a Wardrop equilibrium.
5.2 Related Work
The computation of Wardrop equilibria can be formulated as a min-cost flow
problem. For an overview of classical methods for finding a minimum cost
multi-commodity flow see, e. g., [?] and [?]. Nevertheless, no fast algorithms
for the multi-commodity case are known in general networks. Thus, most
work analyzed confined and related problems.
In [?,?] an efficient distributed steepest-descent algorithm for solving multi-
commodity flow problems with linear latency functions has been presented
recently. Several authors (e. g.. [?,?]) consider dynamic routing from an online-
learning perspective. Awerbuch and Kleinberg [?] present an algorithm for the
online shortest path problem in an end-to-end feedback model. Blum et al.
[?] show that approximate Wardrop equilibria defined in a similar way can
be attained if the agents follow no-regret algorithms. Their bounds on the
convergence time depend polynomially on the regret bounds and network
size and depend pseudopolynomially on the maximum slope of the latency
functions.
The problem of load-balancing has also been studied in various discrete
settings for networks of parallel links. For the case of identical links, both se-
quential [?] and concurrent distributed algorithms were considered [?]. Even-
Dar et al. [?] consider distributed algorithms for load balancing on links with
speeds using sampling rules which depend pseudopolynomially on the speed
of the links. A variant of the replication policy [?] has also been applied in
congestion games [?].
5.3 Preliminaries and Initial Results
In this chapter we consider arbitrary non-negative, non-decreasing and differ-
entiable latency function. In particular, we do not require semi-convex latency
functions. We assume that the set of allowed paths Pi for commodity i is
represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and may assume that the sets
Pi are disjoint and define iP to be the unique commodity to which path P
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belongs. We normalize the demand by ∑i∈[k]∑P∈Pi fP = ∑i∈[k] di = 1. Further-
more, for v ∈ V and i ∈ [k], the total flow of commodity i through vertex v
is fv,i = ∑(u,v)∈E f(u,v),i = ∑(v,w)∈E f(v,w),i for v /∈ {si, ti} and fsi,i = fti,i = di.
Finally, while in previous chapters Li( f ) denoted the unique path latency at
equilibrium in commodity i, now Li( f ) = ∑e∈E `e( f ) · ( fe,i/di) denotes the
weighted average latency of commodity i ∈ [k]. Note that for unit demand the
total latency C( f ) = ∑e∈E `e( f ) · fe is also the overall average latency.
Recall that Wardrop equilibria are exactly those allocations that minimize
the following potential function introduced in [?]:
Φ( f ) = ∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
`e(u) du .
The minimum potential is denoted by Φ∗ = min f∈F Φ( f ). Every flow
f with Φ( f ) = Φ∗ is then at Wardrop equilibrium. We assume that Φ∗ is
positive. The case that Φ∗ = 0 can be treated by adding virtual offsets to the
latency functions. For a detailed treatment see [?].
The algorithms presented in this paper will compute approximate equilib-
ria in the following bicriterial sense.
Definition 13 (δ-e-equilibrium). Consider a flow f of unit demand and let
P δi = {P ∈ Pi | `P( f ) > Li( f ) + δC( f )}
denote the set of δ-expensive paths of commodity i ∈ [k]. A flow is at a δ-e-
equilibrium if
∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pδi
fP ≤ e.
This definition of approximate Wardrop equilibria requires that almost all
flow utilizes paths with a latency that is close to the average of their own
commodity. A similar definition of approximate Nash equilibria is used, e. g.,
in [?].
5.4 Elasticity of Latency Functions
Our algorithms take the steepness of the latency functions into account when
deciding how much flow to shift from one path to another. In [?] it was shown
that the critical parameter in this setting is not the slope but the elasticity.
Definition 14 (Elasticity). For any positive differentiable function
` : R≥0 → R≥0, the elasticity of ` at x is r(x) = x·`
′(x)
`(x) .
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In other words, the elasticity of a function is bounded from above by r if the
(absolute) slope at any point is at most by a factor of r larger than the slope of
the line connecting the origin and the point (x, `(x)). Note that a polynomial
with positive coefficients and degree r has elasticity at most r, hence, elasticity
can be considered as a generalization of the degree of such a polynomial. The
function a · exp(λ x), x ∈ [0, 1] has maximum elasticity λ.
5.5 Implicit Path Decomposition
Wardrop equilibria are defined with respect to path flows. Our algorithms,
however, will make use only of the edge flow vectors, which do not determine
a vector of path flows uniquely. However, in a DAG, an edge flow vector
( fe)e∈E induces a natural vector of path flows by starting with the flow injected
at the source, and splitting the flow at each vertex v such that the set of paths
containing the outgoing edge e receives a flow proportional to fe. Since the
decomposition for one commodity i ∈ [k] is independent of the flow of other
commodities, we can omit the index i for simplicity.
Definition 15. Consider any edge flow vector ( fe)e∈E (for some commodity i). For
any path P = (v1, . . . , vl) let
f˜P = fv1 ·
l−1
∏
j=1
f(vj,vj+1)
fvj
.
Whereas the path flow vector ( f˜P)P∈P may contain an exponential number
of components, the definition of f˜ allows us to compute sums of path flows
that contain a common subpath easily and without summing up an exponen-
tial number of terms. This is made precise by the following results that also
show that the vector f˜ = ( f˜P)P∈P is a valid path decomposition of f = ( fe)e∈E.
Lemma 30. Let P denote a path (not necessarily contained in P). Then,
∑
Q⊇P,Q∈P
f˜Q = f˜P .
Proof. Let P = (v1, . . . , vk). If v1 = s and vk = t, for every Q ∈ P with Q ⊇ P
we have Q = P and the statement is trivial. The proof is by reverse induction
on the length of P. For |P| = n, we know that for any Q ⊇ P, Q = P and the
statement is trivial again. Now assume that the statement holds for all paths
of length k and consider some path P = (v1, . . . , vk = w) with either v1 6= s or
vk 6= t. There are two (overlapping) cases:
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1. vk 6= t. Then,
∑
Q⊇P,Q∈P
f˜Q = ∑
u∈Succ(vk)
∑
Q⊇P·(vk,u),Q∈P
f˜Q
= ∑
u∈Succ(vk)
f˜P·(vk,u)
= ∑
u∈Succ(vk)
f˜P ·
f(vk,u)
fvk
= f˜P .
The second equality is the induction hypothesis and the third is the def-
inition of f˜ .
2. v1 6= s. Analogous.
As a corollary, we see that the flow decomposition ( f˜P)P∈P is actually com-
patible with the original path flows ( fe)e∈E. In addition, for every P ∈ P , f˜P is
obviously non-negative.
Corollary 31. For any e ∈ E,
fe = ∑
P3e
f˜P .
Proof. Consider an edge e = (v, w). Then,
fe = fv · fefv = f˜e = ∑P3e,P∈P
f˜P ,
where the second inequality is the definition of f˜e and last equality is due to
Lemma 30.
5.6 Distributed Computation Model
Our algorithms operate in the following setting. Agents operate in a syn-
chronous, round-based fashion. We assume that there is a billboard via which
the agents are able to share information. On this billboard each agent can
observe the edge flows of its own commodity and the latency values of the
paths it uses. Agents know an upper bound r on the elasticity of the latency
functions, but they do not know the latency functions themselves. However,
it is easily possible to extend our algorithm such that it does not rely on the
knowledge of a bound on the elasticity.
In every round an agent can update the edge flows of its own commodity
on the billboard. These updates become visible to all agents only in the next
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round. All agents execute the same algorithm in parallel. Therefore, in the
descriptions of our algorithms, we may omit the index for the commodity, i. e.,
fe refers to the flow fe,i of commodity i on edge e.
Let us remark that the billboard is a purely theoretical construction. It
may model systems where this information is collected centrally and polled
by or broadcast to the agents at intervals, but may also model scenarios in
which agents concurrently perform measurements over finite intervals of time
in order to obtain the necessary latency information.
5.7 A Pseudopolynomial Algorithm
Our first approach works by simulating the replication policy presented in [?].
We will see that this can be done in polynomial time although this policy
operates on an exponential number of paths.
5.7.1 The Replication Policy
Let us start by introducing the replication policy formally. We consider an
infinite set of agents each of which controls an infinitesimal amount of flow
which it assigns to a path. In each round agents may migrate their flow from
the current path to another one. Consider an agent in commodity i ∈ [k]
currently using path P ∈ Pi. Whenever activated it performs two steps.
1. Sampling. Sample another path Q where the probability to sample any
path Q′ equals fQ′/di.
2. Migration. There are two cases:
(a) `Q ≥ `P. In this case the agent stays with its old path.
(b) `Q < `P. The agent migrates to the sampled path Q with probability
λ · (`P − `Q) for some constant λ > 0 to be determined later.
Altogether, we can characterize our policy by specifying the rate of agents
migrating from one path P ∈ Pi to another path Q ∈ Pi with `Q( f ) < `P( f )
within one round. This rate can be obtained by multiplying the probabilities
specified in steps (1) and (2) with the volume of agents using path P. For this
rate we obtain
ρPQ = λ · fP ·
fQ
di
· (`P − `Q)
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if `Q < `P and ρPQ = 0 otherwise. Thus, we can compute a sequence of flow
vectors ( fP(t))P∈P generated by this policy by summing over all paths Q:
fP(t + 1) = fP(t) + ∑
Q∈Pi
ρQP − ∑
Q∈Pi
ρPQ
= fP(t) + λ fP ∑
Q∈Pi
fQ
di
(`Q − `P)
= fP(t) + λ fP (Li − `P) . (5.1)
5.7.2 Convergence Towards Equilibria
For the time being assume that agents are migrating in a continuous fashion
as described by the above rules. Then an infinitesimal amount of flow dx mi-
grating from a path P to another path Q improving its latency from `P to `Q
causes the potential Φ to reduce by (`P − `Q) dx. Since we only accept migra-
tions that improve the latency, this implies that the potential always decreases
which in turn implies convergence towards a Wardrop equilibrium if all paths
are used in the initial flow. However, in our concurrent round-based model,
flow is not shifted continuously, but in finite chunks. Thus, if these chunks
are chosen too large, overshooting and oscillation effects may occur. This issue
can be resolved by choosing the migration rate in step 2(b) of the replication
policy carefully. In [?] it was shown that if we choose λ = Θ(1/`′max) small
enough with
`′max = max
P∈P
max
f∈F ∑e∈P
`′e( f ) ,
convergence towards Wardrop equilibria can be guaranteed (provided that ini-
tially all paths have non-zero flow and hence positive sampling probability).
We may assume that `′max > 0 since otherwise all latency functions are con-
stant, and our problem can be solved trivially by assigning the entire flow to
the path with lowest latency.
Theorem 32 ( [?, ?, ?]). If λ = Θ(1/`′max) sufficiently small, the replication policy
given by Equation (5.1) with initial flow f (0) = f 0 converges towards a Wardrop
equilibrium if f 0P > 0 for all P ∈ P . Furthermore, the number of rounds in which the
flow is not at a δ-e-equilibrium is
O
(
1
e2 δ2
· `
′
max
`min
· log
(
Φ( f 0)
Φ∗
))
where `min denotes a lower bound on the latency on any edge.
One may observe that the ratio between maximum slope and minimum
latency used in this theorem depends on the scale by which we measure flow.
This scale, however, is fixed since we have normalized the total flow demand
to be d = 1.
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5.7.3 Simulating the Replication Policy
By a naive application of Theorem 32 we can compute a sequence of flow
vectors ( f (t))t≥0 according to Equation (5.1) to obtain approximate Wardrop
equilibria. However, this approach is rendered computationally intractable by
the fact that there may be an exponential number of variables fP.
In the following, we describe an algorithm that computes the iterative
change rates of the edge flows according to the implicit flow decomposition
f˜ described in the preceding section. To that end, we show that the change
rates of the edge flows fe can be expressed solely in terms of edge flows and
edge latencies (i. e., without explicit reference to the fP variables). It suffices to
know the weighted average latencies of all paths containing e defined as
Le = ∑
P3e
fP
fe
· `P . (5.2)
Recall that we have fixed a commodity here, so we may drop the index i.
Lemma 33. Consider an edge flow vector ( fe(t))e∈E and its path decomposition f˜ (t),
and let f˜ (t + 1) denote the flow generated by the replication policy in Equation (5.1)
from f˜ (t). Finally, let fe(t + 1) = ∑P3e f˜P(t + 1). Then,
fe(t + 1) = fe(t) + λ · fe(t) · (C− Le) .
Proof. Let f = f (t) and f ′ = f (t + 1). By definition of fe,
f ′e − fe = ∑
P3e
( f ′P − fP)
= λ · ∑
P3e
fP · (C− `P)
= λ · fe ·
(
C− ∑P3e fP`P
fe
)
,
where the last term equals Le.
In order to obtain the value of Le, we implicitly compute the path decompo-
sition f˜ , i. e., for every edge e′ we compute the flow caused by paths containing
e on edge e′. This is done by Algorithm SimulatedReplication e ∈ E. Since
there are m edges, each iteration can be performed in time O (m2).
Corollary 34. The sequence of flow vectors computed by Algorithm SimulatedRepli-
cation converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria. Furthermore, the number of
rounds in which the flow is not at a δ-e-equilibrium with respect to f˜ is bounded by
O
(
1
e2 δ2
· `
′
max
`min
· log
(
Φ( f 0)
Φ∗
))
,
where f 0 is the initial flow vector. Each iteration takes time O (m2).
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Algorithm 2 SimulatedReplication() (executed by all commodities in paral-
lel; ( fe)e∈E denotes the edge flows vector of commodity i)
1: for all edges e ∈ E do
2: sort all edges (v, w) in the subgraph reachable from e topologically
3: compute total flow of all paths containing e and (v, w):
f˜ (v,w)e = ∑(u,v)∈E f˜
(u,v)
e · f(v,w)fv
4: reverse all edges and repeat steps 2 and 3 for edges between e and s
5: compute Le = ∑e′
f˜ e
′
e
fe
`e′
6: f ′e ← fe + λ · fe · (C− Le) with λ = 1/`′max
7: end for
8: replace ( fe)e∈E on the billboard with ( f ′e)e∈E
Proof. First note that for any edge e′ the value of f˜ e′e computed in line 3 of the
algorithm equals the volume of all paths containing e and e′ with respect to
our implicit decomposition f˜ , i. e., f˜ e
′
e = ∑P⊇{e,e′} f˜P. Thus, the value Le com-
puted in line 5 equals the definition of Le in Equation (5.2). Hence, Lemma 33
implies that the edge flow vector computed by our algorithm after one round
equals the edge flow vector obtained by applying the replication policy given
by Equation (5.1) to the path decomposition ( f˜ )P∈P . Combining this with the
upper bounds on the convergence time given in [?, ?], the claim follows.
5.8 The Polynomial Time Algorithm
The migration probability specified for step 2(b) of the replication policy can
get very small since the latency difference `P− `Q may become small in relation
to `′max if λ = 1/`′max is chosen constant. This causes the algorithm to achieve
only a pseudopolynomial convergence time depending on the maximum slope
of the latency functions. In this section we present an approach that avoids this
dependence.
To this end, we choose the amount of flow removed from a path propor-
tional to its relative deviation (`P − LiP)/`P from the average and the recip-
rocal of the elasticity r to obtain a polynomial number of communication
rounds. Whereas in the preceding section the amount of flow removed or
added to a path within one round could be expressed in a nice closed form as
λ · fP · (C− `P) (Equation (5.1)), this is now no longer possible.
To compute flow updates in polynomial time we use a randomized flow
decomposition. First, we sample a path at random according to the implicit
path decomposition f˜ , i. e., the probability to sample path P is f˜P/diP . Since the
length of a path is bounded by n, this is possible in time n log n by representing
adjacent vertices and their flows in a binary tree. Now, the path is assigned a
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certain flow volume fP. For the time being, assume that we assign the entire
bottleneck flow to P. Then, if P has latency above LiP , we remove a portion of
x = Θ
(
fP · `P − LiPr `P
)
of its flow and distribute it proportionally among all admissible paths, i. e.,
after removing a flow of x from path P, the flow on every edge e ∈ E is
increased by ( fe,i/di) · x. Thus, the computed flow remains feasible.
Why does this process decrease the potential quickly? As long as we are
not at a δ-e-equilibrium, the probability of sampling a δ-expensive path is at
least e. In this case, the latency gain and thus the potential gain per flow unit
will be large and proportional to f˜P. If we sample only a single path, we
may in fact assign the entire bottleneck flow to it. We can lower bound the
probability that this bottleneck flow is not too small (Lemma 40). To increase
the potential gain further, we repeat this process T times. Doing this, we can
no longer assign the entire bottleneck flow to a path since it may happen that
an edge is sampled several times. Consider an edge e. If this edge is sampled
k times, we may consume at most fe/k of its flow in every round. If fe = Θ(1),
we will have k = Θ(T), so in this case we limit the amount of flow consumed
in one round to fe/k = Θ(1/T). For edges with less flow, however, we may
consume more than fe/k per round, since these edges are sampled less often.
It turns out that we can increase the potential gain by a factor of Ω(m) if we
choose T = Θ(m log m) and set the flow assigned to a sampled path to an
Θ(1/ log m) fraction of the bottleneck flow. More precisely, let
∆e = min
{
1
7 m log m
,
fe
7 log m
}
.
We start with an empty decomposition. In a round in which path P is sampled
we increase fP by ∆e∗ , where e∗ is a bottleneck edge in P. We say that an
edge is alive if the overall flow assigned to paths containing e is at most fe −
∆e (i. e.there is still a flow of ∆e remaining, so it can safely be sampled one
more time without having our decomposition exceeding the flow of e). Our
algorithm terminates as soon as there are any edges that are not alive. The
final algorithm RandomizedBalancing is described in Algorithm 3.
Under the assumption that the latency functions are constant, we can thus
show that the potential decreases in every round by a factor that only depends
on e and δ, and the elasticity r (Lemma 44). We furthermore show that due to
our careful migration rate the potential gain with respect to the true latency
functions is still at least half of the potential gain with respect to constant
latencies (Lemma 42). Finally, we show that the expected potential gain implies
a bound on the time to reach a minimum potential (Lemma 46). Altogether,
this yields the following upper bound for our algorithm.
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Theorem 35. Assume that for the initial flow vector f0 it holds that fe > 0 for all
e ∈ E. Then, the sequence of flow vectors computed by Algorithm RandomizedBal-
ancing converges towards the set of Wardrop equilibria. Furthermore, the expected
number of rounds, in which the flow is not at a δ-e-equilibrium with respect to f˜ , is
bounded by
O
(
r
e3 δ2
log
(
Φ( f0)
Φ∗
))
,
if r is an upper bound on the elasticity of the latency functions. The computation time
of each round is bounded by O (n log n ·m log m).
We present the proof after establishing the necessary lemmas.
Algorithm 3 RandomizedBalancing(r) (executed by all commodities in par-
allel; ( fe)e∈E denotes the edge flows vector of commodity i)
1: F ← 0
2: for T = m log m times do
3: sample a path P where P [P] = f˜Pdi
4: let e∗ denote the bottleneck edge of P; let fP = ∆e∗
5: if `P > Li then
6: reduce the flow on all edges e ∈ P by ∆ fP = fP · `P−Li4 r `P
7: F ← F + ∆ fP
8: if for any e ∈ P, e is not alive then
9: abort loop and continue in line 13
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: increase the flow on all edges e ∈ E proportionally by fedi · F
Note that our algorithm can be easily modified for the case that the elastic-
ity of the latency functions is not known to the algorithm in advance. In that
case, we can find an upper bound r on the maximum elasticity by using an
exponential search technique. We continue doubling the value of r until for
the first time it holds that for all edges relevant to the commodity, the elasticity
of the latency functions is bounded by r within the interval defined by the old
and new flow values.
5.8.1 Useful Inequalities
To establish the necessary lemmas we make use of the following well known
facts.
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Lemma 36 (Chernoff Bound [?]). Let X be a real valued random variable that is
the sum of 0-1 random variables. Then
P [X ≥ q ·E [X]] ≤ 2−q·E[X]
for q ≥ 6.
Lemma 37 (Markov’s Inequality). Let X be a real valued random variable and
h : R→ R monotone non-decreasing. If E [h(X)] is defined, then
P [X ≥ a] ≤ E [h(X)]
h(a)
.
Lemma 38 (Jensen’s Inequality). Let X be real valued random variable and f : R→
R a convex function. If E [X] and E [ f (X)] are defined, then
E [ f (X)] ≤ f (E [X]) .
Lemma 39 (Cauchy Schwarz Inequality). For two vectors (ai), (bi) ∈ Rn
(
n
∑
i=1
ai bi)2 ≤ (
n
∑
i=1
a2i )(
n
∑
i=1
b2i ) .
5.8.2 Randomized Decomposition
Our algorithm generates a randomized flow decomposition using a sampling
process based on f˜ . In this section, we lower bound the probability that the
bottleneck flows of the sampled paths are not too small. Furthermore, we
show that the total flow volume removed from every edge is at most fe with
high probability.
For a unit flow f , let PP∼ f [X(P)] denote the probability that event X(P)
occurs if the probability to draw a path P equals fP.
Lemma 40. Consider a flow f of unit demand and a set of paths Pe with ∑P∈Pe f˜P =
e. Then,
PP∼ f˜
[
P ∈ Pe ∧min
e∈P
fe ≥ e2 m
]
≥ e
2
.
Proof. We consider a scaled flow vector which supports only paths in Pe.
f ′P =
{
f˜P
e P ∈ Pe
0 P /∈ Pe .
Observe that the total demand of f ′ is 1 again, hence
PP∼ f ′ [P = Q] = PP∼ f˜ [P = Q | P ∈ Pe] .
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Now,
PP∼ f˜
[
P ∈ Pe ∧min
e∈P
fe ≥ e2 m
]
= PP∼ f˜ [P ∈ Pe] ·PP∼ f˜
[
min
e∈P
f ′e ≥
1
2 m
| P ∈ Pe
]
= e ·PP∼ f ′
[
min
e∈P
f ′e ≥
1
2 m
]
,
where the first equality uses the definition of f ′ and the second one uses the
above observation. It remains to show that
PP∼ f ′
[
min
e∈P
f ′e ≥
1
2 m
]
≥ 1/2 . (5.3)
To see this, let d(x, y) denote the number of edges of a shortest path connecting
x and y. We can show that P [e = (v, w) ∈ P] = fe by induction on d(s, v). This
holds for d(s, v) = 0 by definition of f˜ . Now, assume that the statement holds
for all edges (u, v) with d(s, u) = k and consider an edge e = (v, w) with
d(s, v) = k + 1.
P [e ∈ P] = P [v ∈ P] ·P [e ∈ P | v ∈ P]
= ∑
(u,v)
P [(u, v) ∈ P] · fe
fv
= ∑
(u,v)
f(u,v) ·
fe
fv
= fe .
With E′ = {e ∈ E | fe ≤ 1/(2 m)},
P
[
P 3 e : e ∈ E′] ≤ ∑
e∈E′
P [e ∈ P] ≤ ∑
e∈E′
fe ≤ |E
′|
2 m
≤ 1
2
.
Thus, Equation (5.3) holds which completes the proof.
We now consider a sequence of T = m log m rounds. Observe that ∆e is an
upper bound on the flow removed from a path containing e by our algorithm,
since for the bottleneck edge e∗, ∆e∗ = mine∈P{∆e}. The flow on e may decrease
to below zero only if it is contained in the sampled path at least fe/∆e times.
In the following we show that this is unlikely.
Lemma 41. With probability 1− o(1), after a sequence of T = m log m iterations,
all edges are still alive.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 40 we have seen that the probability to hit edge
e in one round equals fe. Let the random variable X denote the number of hits
in T rounds. We have E [X] = T fe. An edge is alive if X ≤ fe/∆e − 1. There
are two cases:
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1. fe < 1m implying ∆e = fe/(7 log m). Then,
P
[
X >
fe
∆e
− 1
]
= P
[
X > E [X] ·
(
7
fe m
− 1
T fe
)]
≤ P
[
X > E [X] ·
(
6
fe m
)]
≤ 2−E[X]· 6fe m = m−6 .
The first inequality is the definition of T and ∆e and uses our assump-
tion that fe · m < 1, and the second inequality is Chernoff’s inequality
(Lemma 36).
2. fe ≥ 1m implying ∆e = 1/(7 T). Then, with the same arguments,
P
[
X >
fe
∆e
− 1
]
= P
[
X > E [X] ·
(
1
T ∆e
− 1
T fe
)]
≤ P
[
X > E [X] ·
(
7− 1
log(m)
)]
≤ 2−6·E[X] ≤ 2−6·log m = m−6 .
This time the first inequality uses our assumption fe ≥ 1/m.
In both cases, the probability that edge e is not alive at the end of a sequence
of T iterations is bounded by m−6. Using a union bound, the probability
that at least one edge does not survive is at most m−5, and consequently the
probability that all edges survive the sequence is at least 1−m−5.
5.8.3 Lower Bounding the Potential Gain
We use a potential function argument to prove convergence. In order to show
that our algorithm avoids oscillations, we consider the potential gain achieved
within one round. We show that this potential gain is at least half of the po-
tential gain that would occur if latency values were fixed at the beginning of a
round. A second lemma shows that, in expectation, the potential decreases by
a factor in every round, as long as we are not yet at an approximate equilib-
rium.
Lemma 42. Let r denote an upper bound on the elasticity of the latency functions. For
a flow vector f consider a flow vector f ′ generated by Algorithm RandomizedBal-
ancing(r) (Algorithm 3) with positive probability. For any P ∈ P let ∆ fP denote
the amount of flow removed from path P. Then,
Φ( f )−Φ( f ′) ≥ 1
2
· ∑
P∈P
(`P( f )− LiP) · ∆ fP .
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To prove the lemma, we need the following fact about functions with
bounded elasticity:
Fact 43 ( [?]). If the elasticity of a function ` is bounded from above by r, then for
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/(2 r), it holds that `((1+ δ) · x) ≤ (1+ 2 r δ) · `(x).
Proof (of Lemma 42). Throughout this proof, whenever we write `, Li and C
without an argument, we refer to `( f ), Li( f ) and C( f ). Let VP = (`P− LiP)∆ fP
denote the virtual potential gain of any path P with `P ≥ Li. It can easily be
checked (see [?]) that
Φ( f )−Φ( f ′) = ∑
P∈P
VP − ∑
e∈E
∫ f ′e
fe
(`e(u)− `e) du .
The true potential gain Φ( f )−Φ( f ′) would be achieved if the latency values
did not change due to the changing flow. The terms in the second sum can
be understood as error terms that reduce the potential gain to account for this
idealistic assumption. We show that the error terms are at most half of the
virtual potential gain. To that end, we attribute
VeP = VP ·
fe,iP · `e
2 · diP · C
= (`P − LiP) · ∆ fP ·
fe,iP · `e
2 · diP · C
of the virtual potential gain made by path P to edge e. Note that summing
over all edges e, this consumes precisely half of the virtual potential gain of
path P, i. e., ∑e∈E VeP = VP/2. Thus, by a reordering of the terms,
Φ( f )−Φ( f ′) ≤ ∑
P∈P
VP
2
+ ∑
e∈E
(
∑
P∈P
VeP −
∫ f ′e
fe
(`e(u)− `e) du
)
.
Hence, to prove the theorem it suffices to show that for any edge e ∈ E,∫ f ′e
fe
(`e(u)− `e) du ≤ ∑
P∈P
VeP . (5.4)
Fix an edge e ∈ E and assume f ′e > fe. Edges with f ′e < fe can be treated
symmetrically. We partition the integral over the interval [ fe, f ′e ] into segments
of width ∆ f eP, where ∆ f
e
P = ∆ fP · fe,iP /diP is the amount of flow moved from
P to paths containing e. We consider the sequence of paths Pj sampled by our
algorithm in ascending order of (`P − LiP)/`P. In this sequence a path may
occur more than once. Let f le = fe + ∑
l
j=1 ∆ f
e
Pj
. To conclude the proof, we
prove Equation (5.4) by showing that for l ≥ 0
∫ f le
fe
(`e(u)− `e) du ≤
l
∑
i=1
VePi
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by induction on l. Then, the increase of flow of edge e caused by the first l
paths is
f le − fe ≤
l
∑
j=1
∆ fPj ·
fe,iPj
diPj
≤
l
∑
j=1
fPj ·
`Pj − LiPj
4 r · `Pj
·
fe,iPj
diPj
≤ 1
4 r
·
`Pl − LiPl
`Pl
·
k
∑
i=1
fe,i
≤ 1
4 r
·
`Pl − LiPl
`Pl
· fe .
The third inequality holds since we can separate the sum into sums over paths
from only one commodity. Then the fP in sum cancel out the di’s. Now, due to
the bounded elasticity of `e, we can apply Fact 43 to bound the total increase
of latency caused by this increase of flow by
∆`le = `e( f
l
e)− `e ≤ 2 r · `e ·
f le − fe
fe
≤ `e ·
`Pl − LiPl
2 `Pl
.
Using the definition of ∆ f ePl ,
∆ f ePl · ∆`le ≤
`e fe,iPl
2 `Pl diPl
· (`Pl − LiPl ) · ∆ fPl ≤ V
e
Pl .
Using the induction hypothesis and the preceding inequality we have
∫ f le
fe
(`e(u)− `e) du ≤
∫ f l−1e
fe
(`e(u)− `e) du + ∆ f ePl · ∆`le ≤
l
∑
i=1
VePi
and the proof is complete.
Lemma 44. Assume that f is a flow that is not at δ-e-equilibrium, and let the random
variable f ′ denote a flow generated by our algorithm. Then
E
[
Φ( f ′)
] ≤ Φ( f ) ·(1−Ω(e3δ2
r
))
.
Proof. For the time being, assume that the latency functions are constant. Ap-
plying Markov’s inequality (Lemma 37) with X = Li, a = 2 L/ε and h = id,
the total volume of flow in commodities with Li > 2 · C/e is at most e/2. We
consider only commodities with Li ≤ 2 · C/e. In total, at least a flow volume
of e utilizes δ-expensive paths, and there is still at least a volume of e/2 left in
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the commodities we consider. Consider such a commodity i ∈ [k], and denote
the flow volume using δ-expensive paths in this commodity by ei.
Consider any iteration satisfying the precondition that all edges are alive.
Let P denote the path sampled by the algorithm. Consider the event that
`P ≥ Li + δC and the minimum edge flow along P is at least ei/(2 m). By
Lemma 40 the probability of this event is at least ei/(2 di) (we have to scale the
flow of this commodity by a factor 1/di to make it a unit flow). The amount
of flow removed from this path by our algorithm is
ei
2 m
· 1
7 log m
· `P − Li
4 r `P
≥ ei e δ
113 r m log m
where we have used that `P ≥ Li + δC and Li ≤ 2 C/e. The latency gain of this
path is then at least δC. Since this event happens with probability ei/(2 di) the
expected virtual potential gain of such a path is then at least
e2i e δ
2
226 r di m log m
C .
By Lemma 41 the probability that in this iteration all edges are alive is 1− o(1),
and the expected potential gain computed above is independent of this event.
Summing up over all T = m log m iterations and all commodities, the total
expected virtual potential gain of one round is at least
(1− o(1)) · ∑
i∈[k]
e2i e δ
2
226 r di
C ≥ (1− o(1)) · e
3δ2
226 r
C .
For the last inequality we have applied the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality (see
Lemma 39) with ai = ei/
√
di and bi =
√
di. This implies the claim since C is
an upper bound on Φ and Lemma 42 ensures that the true potential gain with
respect to the real latency functions is at least half of the potential gain with
respect to the constant latency functions.
5.8.4 From Expected Potential Gain to Expected Stopping
Time
The preceding section has shown that in every round the potential decreases by
a factor in expectation. Intuitively, this implies an expected running time that
is logarithmic in this factor and the initial values. This intuition is made precise
by the following two lemmas. Although it seems likely that similar lemmas
have been proven elsewhere before, we are not aware of any formulation that
can be used here.
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Lemma 45. Let X0, X1, . . . denote a sequence of non-negative random variables. As-
sume that for all i ≥ 0
E [Xi | Xi−1 = xi−1] ≤ xi−1 − 1
and let τ denote the first time t such that Xt = 0. Then,
E [τ | X0 = x0] ≤ x0 .
Proof. The proof is by induction on x0. Let
T(s) = E [τ | X0 = s] .
Clearly, T(0) = 0. For i ∈ [x0] let p(i) denote the probability that x0 − X1 = i.
By our assumption and definition of p(i),
1 ≤ x0 −E [X1 | X0 = x0] =
x0
∑
i=0
p(i) · i .
By definition of T(j),
T(j) = 1+
j
∑
i=0
p(i) · T(j− i)
≤ 1+ p(0) · T(j) +
j
∑
i=1
p(i) · (j− i)
= 1+ p(0) · T(j) + j · (1− p(0))−
j
∑
i=1
p(i) · i
≤ p(0) · T(j) + j · (1− p(0))
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis for 1 ≤ i < j. Hence,
T(j) ≤ j, implying our claim.
Lemma 46. Let X0, X1, . . . denote a sequence of non-negative random variables. As-
sume that for all i ≥ 0
E [Xi | Xi−1 = xi−1] ≤ xi−1 · α
for some constant α ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, fix some constant x∗ ∈ (0, x0], and let τ
be the random variable that describes the smallest t such that Xt ≤ x∗. Then,
E [τ | X0 = x0] ≤ 2log(1/α) · log
( x0
x∗
)
.
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Proof. In order to apply Lemma 45 we transform our random variable into a
new sequence of random variables
Yi = 2 · log(Xi)− log(x
∗)
log(1/α)
.
Let xi = 2yi·log(1/α)/2+log x
∗
. Then,
E [Yi | Yi−1 = yi−1] = E
[
2 · log(Xi)− log x
∗
log(1/α)
| Xi−1 = xi−1
]
= 2 · E [log(Xi) | Xi−1 = xi−1]− log(x
∗)
log(1/α)
≤ 2 · log (E [Xi | Xi−1 = xi−1])− log(x
∗)
log(1/α)
≤ 2 · log(xi−1 · α)− log(x
∗)
log(1/α)
= yi−1 − 2
where the first inequality is Jensen’s inequality (Lemma 38) and the second is
our assumption on the sequence Xi. Observe that Xi = x∗ if and only if Yi = 0
and bYi + 1c = 0 implies that Xi ≤ x∗. Now,
E [bYic | bYi−1c = yi−1] ≤ E [Yi | bYi−1c = yi−1]
≤ max
z:byi−1c=z
E [Yi | Yi−1 = z]
≤ max
z:byi−1c=z
z− 2
≤ yi−1 − 1
implying that the sequence bYic satisfies the conditions of Lemma 45. Let τ˜
denote the smallest i such that bYi + 1c = 0, and observe that X0 = x0 implies
bY0 + 1c = b2 log(x0/x∗)/ log(1/α) + 1c. Hence,
E [τ | X0 = x0] ≤ E [τ˜ | X0 = x0]
≤ E
[
τ˜ | bY0 + 1c =
⌊
2 · log(x0/x
∗)
log(1/α)
+ 1
⌋]
≤
⌊
2 · log(x0/x
∗)
log(1/α)
+ 1
⌋
,
our desired bound.
5.8.5 Convergence Time
Finally, we can prove our main result.
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Proof of Theorem 35. Again, convergence follows from Lemma 42 as in [?]. To
obtain a bound on the convergence time, let f0, f1, . . . denote a sequence of
flow
E [Φ( ft+1) | Φ( ft) = φ] ≤ φ ·
(
1−Ω
(
e3 δ2
r
))
.
Thus, the sequence (Φ( ft))t≥0 satisfies the conditions of Lemma 46 and the
expected time until Φ( ft) reaches its minimum Φ∗ implying that ft is a δ-e-
equilibrium is
2
log
((
1−Ω
(
e3 δ2
r
))−1) log
(
Φ( f0)
Φ∗
)
= O
(
r
e3 δ2
log
(
Φ( f0)
Φ∗
))
,
our desired bound.
One path can be sampled in time O (n log n), the bottleneck edge can be
found in time O (n), and the flow update can be computed in time O (n).
Altogether, at most T = m log m iterations have to be computed. Finally, the
removed flow can be reinserted in time O (m).

Chapter 6
Concluding Thoughts
In this thesis we have studied a variety of problems in Wardrop’s traffic model
that revolve around the inefficiency of equilibria and their paradoxical behav-
ior. We analyzed two different means to reduce the price of anarchy, studied
the stability and sensitivity of equilibria, and designed a distributed algorithm
to compute approximate equilibria. Throughout our research, structural sim-
ple networks like parallel link networks or Braess’s original network served as
benchmark networks providing first insight, guiding our research, and finally
extending our understanding of Wardrop equilibria.
6.1 Reducing the Price of Anarchy
In the first part of this thesis, we draw connections between several established
concepts of reducing the price of anarchy. Generalizing marginal cost pricing,
we first investigated optimal taxes if only a subnetwork can be taxed. While
we provided an efficient algorithm to compute taxes minimizing the network
wide performance in parallel link networks with linear latency functions, this
problem turned out to be NP-hard in arbitrary networks with multiple com-
modities. Our positive results may seem quite restricted, however, observe
that in contrast the optimal leader strategy in Stackelberg routing is NP-hard
to compute for the same class of simple networks [?].
Our results lead to a set of intriguing questions. The prime goal is an ap-
proximation algorithm for multi-commodity networks. Unfortunately, we are
not aware of any non-trivial approximation algorithms incurring an approxi-
mation ratio less than the price of anarchy. For single-commodity networks an
interesting question is whether one can close the “complexity gap” or not. Can
one extend the NP-hardness results to more general classes of networks? Is
there a polynomial time algorithm for parallel link networks with polynomial
latency functions? Technically, the reasons that our proof fails for polynomial
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latency functions are that the total latency does not remain convex and the
latency threshold L(d) does not remain linear.
Also, the question of how to optimally set taxes for a finite set of edges
or even for a single edge remains open. Algorithms for this problem could
constitute useful modules for approximation algorithms for the general case.
Following this line of research, first (albeit negative) results have been obtained
recently [?].
Towards another direction, one might want to abandon the strong homo-
geneity assumption. Even for heterogeneous network users that minimize
their own tax versus total latency, optimal taxes can be computed efficiently
for arbitrary multi-commodity networks [?, ?, ?]. What can be said about the
complexity of finding optimal taxes for a given subset of edges in this case?
As outlined we tackled the problem of computing optimal taxes for a given
subset of edges. But in the first place, one needs to decide, which set of links to
tax, given a choice. In light of the large number of possible sets and complex
interactions between taxes on different edges, this problem seems intriguing.
Considering the related problem of computing optimal taxes, such that an
additional tax-dependent objective function, e.g., the number of taxed edges is
optimized, positive results have been obtained recently [?].
To dispense with direct taxing, we proposed a novel approach to reduce
the price of anarchy by routing additional flow. Routing so-dubbed auxiliary
flow δ raises the edge latencies for the selfish flow and thus can be considered
as charging the selfish agents a non-refundable traffic dependent tax of `e( fe +
δe)− `e( fe). There is also a strong connection to Stackelberg routing when the
auxiliary flow is seen as the flow of a leader, who centrally routes its fraction of
flow to improve the global performance. However, the critical difference is that
the leader’s latency does account for the total latency, while the auxiliary flow’s
latency does not. This is the reason why our results on auxiliary flow contrast
those obtained for Stackelberg routing. In particular, the minimal amount of
leader flow inducing the optimal flow can be computed in polynomial time
in arbitrary multi-commodity networks [?]. For auxiliary flow this value is
NP-hard to approximate even within subexponential factors. Alternatively,
auxiliary flow can be interpreted as a separate altruistic commodity that tries
to pilot the routing of the selfish players to a globally desirable state. In related
work it was shown that when all agents are assumed to be partly altruistic, the
price of anarchy can be bounded by a constant in parallel link networks [?].
Yet, using (altruistic) auxiliary flow does not improve the network performance
in this class of networks.
Our hardness result for optimal auxiliary flow is tight for networks with
linear latency functions, because the trivial algorithm, i. e., routing no spam,
yields a 4/3 approximation [?]. For more general sets of latency functions, e. g.,
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for polynomials of bounded degree, the presented instances do not directly
yield tight inapproximability results. The question if the trivial algorithm is
an optimal algorithm for nonlinear latency function is still open.
Reducing the price of anarchy by simply routing an additional amount of
flow seems an appealing approach. But yet, our results show that important
problems related to this approach are rendered computationally infeasible. We
hope that our hardness results inherently rely on the fact that we have confined
ourself to extremal auxiliary flow. This would still allow efficient computation
of flow that improves total latency by an arbitrary amount. Such algorithms
as well as the design of non-trivial approximation algorithms for the problems
considered here would certainly be of great interest.
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In his ground-breaking work, Braess [?] observed that adding capacity to a net-
work might improve or deteriorate the total latency depending on the amount
of input traffic. In other words, the occurrence of Braess’s paradox is demand
sensitive. We employ a family of generalized Braess graphs to bring another
remarkable facet of Wardrop equilibria into the open: Even the slightest in-
crease in the demand may cause every agent to change its path.
However, our sensitivity analysis leaves open some obvious questions. Given
a unit demand flow at Wardrop equilibrium, suppose an edge carrying only
an ε-fraction of flow is removed. How does the path latency change after re-
covering equilibrium? Considering a network with two parallel edges, one
gets a lower bound of 1(1−ε)p . Is this bound tight? Furthermore, we believe that
our bound on the increase of the path latency induced by a demand increase
of (1 + ε)p holds not only for polynomials of bounded degree but for latency
functions with bounded elasticity.
Less specifically, we believe that studying sensitivity of traffic equilibria is
a natural and important task that is worthwhile also in related models, e. g.,
in the presence of heterogeneous agents or in scenarios where finitely many
agents can split their non-negligible amount of flow. Further, while most ex-
isting literature on sensitivity analysis concentrates on qualitative questions,
we are convinced that quantitative studies are equally important and that both
kinds of results nicely complement one another. In this spirit, we have shown
that the vector of edge flows is not only continuously dependent on the traffic
demand [?], but in fact Lipschitz-continuous with constant one (Theorem 27).
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6.3 Distributed Equilibrium Computation
Braess’s original four vertex network demonstrates that naive algorithms for
approximating equilibria fail, even if a central authority has access to com-
plete information about the game. But yet, in a dynamic round-based setting
Wardrop equilibria can be well approximated in a distributed way.
Our distributed algorithm works by redistributing flow of overloaded paths.
To identify such paths we face the subproblem of finding a flow decomposi-
tion that assigns much flow to paths with high latency (induced by the current
flow). In our algorithm we have used a randomized path decomposition to
achieve this goal. It is a natural question whether this randomization can be
avoided. In a greedy approach we could use a path decomposition that chooses
a path with the largest latency, assigns to it a flow equivalent to the bottleneck
flow of this path, and removes it from the network. In fact, a simple example
shows that this approach does not necessarily maximize the unbalancedness
of the decomposition. However, it has been shown in [?] that the problem
of finding an unbalanced decomposition can be reduced to a Min-Cost-Flow
problem. At the cost of an increased running time this could be used as a
module in our algorithm derandomizing it.
In the long run, our algorithm converges towards the set of Wardrop equi-
libria. A weakness of our notion of approximate equilibria, however, is the
fact that the average latency may be arbitrarily far away from the minimum
latency. Furthermore, a δ-e-equilibrium, allows some of the commodities to be
very out of balance.
There are two alternative, stronger definitions of approximate equilibria.
First, one could require all but an e-fraction to deviate from the average of their
commodity by at most δ Li rather than δC. Second, one could also consider de-
viations from the minimum latency rather than from the average latency. It is
unclear whether convergence towards approximate equilibria in this sense can
be guaranteed in polynomial time. This seems questionable in light of corre-
sponding results in the setting of discrete network congestion games. Therein
it has been proven that computing (1+ ε)-approximate Nash equilibria is PLS-
complete. Hence most likely no polynomial time algorithms for this problem
exists.
Finally, it would be desirable to design specialized (not necessarily dis-
tributed) algorithms to compute (exact) Wardrop equilibria that improve upon
the standard solution via convex programming.
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6.4 Dynamic Extensions
Not least we want to comment on an important extension of Wardrop’s model.
Researchers almost exclusively concentrated on the classical static flow model.
This seems a plausible assumption in networks, that are continuously used
by the same number of agents. In these situations, there is no need for the
introduction of a temporal component. However, in many natural network
applications flow travels through a network over time and flow values on edges
change over time. Already Beckmann et al. [?] stated:
The notion of a static equilibrium of flow in a network may be
thought of as somewhat limited... An understanding of dynamic
aspects of the traffic really depends on an understanding of de-
mand substitution over time.
Only recently, Koch and Skutella [?] were the first to explore the avenue of self-
ish flows over time. The authors show how flows over time can be thought of
as traditional network flows plus a scheduling component. They characterized
equilibria and gave first results on the price of anarchy for flows over time.
Their work was followed by alternative approaches to incorporate the notion
of time in selfish networks [?, ?, ?]. However, positive results are rare in exist-
ing work. We believe that extending Wardrop’s traffic model (appropriately)
by incorporating a temporal component embodies an important direction for
future research.
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